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The 9/11 terrorist attack remains one of the darkest moments in American history and has 
had a great impact on the global strategic relationship in the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. To respond to this incident, Taiwan and the United States exchanged information 
and intelligence and signed the Sino-American Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which 
represents Taiwan’s willingness to participate in and cooperate with the international 
community in regards to information exchange, security, and anti-money laundering 
activities and in strengthening an emergency response mechanism. 
At the time, the Taiwanese government, under the idea of “Taiwan needs to have 
what others have,” established a Counterterrorism Office in January 2004, which was 
reorganized as the Office of Homeland Security in 2007. The Office of Homeland 
Security does not directly carry out intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism tasks. 
Instead, it combines intelligence from different intelligence apparatuses for further 
research, analysis, and lateral communication and consultation. 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess whether this two-track mechanism—the 
separation of intelligence and response systems—can respond efficiently to a major 
terrorist attack and whether a comparison of the approaches and experience of the United 
States and Japan offers useful insight into how to organize Taiwan’s system. 
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 MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION A.
Since the Cold War, the emphasis on counterterrorism has become an important 
factor that affects the stability of the world. On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda, the 
international terrorist organization led by the late Osama Bin Laden, conducted a 
shocking terrorist attack against the World Trade Center in New York and at the 
Pentagon, the home of the U.S. Department of Defense. The World Trade Center, a world 
economic symbol, was destroyed in the blink of an eye, the Pentagon, a symbol of U.S. 
military power was severely damaged, and nearly 3,000 people lost their lives. This was 
the most serious incident in the United States’ history since the attack on the Pearl Harbor. 
The 9/11 terrorist attack remains one of the darkest moments in American history and has 
had a great impact on the global strategic relationship in the beginning of the twenty-first 
century.1   
To respond to this incident, Taiwan held four high level meetings on September 
12, September 20, October 8, and October 22, 2001, and discussed its national security in 
accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 counterterrorism 
measure. In addition, an Ad Hoc 9/11 Briefing was presented to the political parties and 
the leaders of parliament, and an Ad Hoc 9/11 Group was established to deliberate on 55 
response plans and 21 burst scenarios with emergency measures including: prevention of 
biochemical attacks, vaccine procurement, and the distribution of the responsibilities of 
drills and rehearsals for ministries. Furthermore, Taiwan and the United States exchanged 
information and intelligence and signed the Sino-American Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty, which represented Taiwan’s willingness to participate and cooperate with the 
international community in regards to information exchange, security, anti-money 
laundering, and strengthening an emergency response mechanism. These plans illustrate 
                                                 
1 National Defense University Collection, Research Papers Album on September 11 Incident in the 
United States and the War on Terror (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, Office of Military History and 
Policy, Translation Office, October 2002), 1. 
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the willingness of Taiwan to combat terrorism internationally. 2   At the time, the 
Taiwanese government, under the idea of “Taiwan needs to have what others have,” 
established a Counterterrorism Office in January 2004, which was reorganized as the 
Office of Homeland Security in 2007. 3  The Office of Homeland Security does not 
directly carry out intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism tasks. Instead, it combines 
intelligence from different intelligence apparatuses for further research, analysis, and 
lateral communication and consultation. If a potential terrorist plot is discovered, the 
office proposes that the Executive Yuan adjust the nation’s level of alert from green to 
yellow or red and take other appropriate defense measures. The purpose of this thesis is 
to assess whether this two-track mechanism—the separation of intelligence and response 
systems—can respond efficiently to a major terrorist attack and whether a comparison of 
the approaches and experience of the United States and Japan offer useful insight into 
how to organize Taiwan’s system.  
 IMPORTANCE B.
Twelve years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the war on 
terrorism has not reduced the threat from terrorism.4  Terrorist attacks occur everywhere 
from the Middle East to Asia and beyond, the October 2002 Bali bombing, the July 2005 
London bombing, suicide attacks at different U.S. consulates, and the November 2008 
Mumbai attacks, and most recently the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. Countries still 
struggle to prevent terrorist attacks, and how to prevent terrorism has become a common 
worry in the world.  
For many years, countries like the U.S. have possessed better counterterrorism 
mechanisms and related response measures to prevent terrorist attacks against their 
homelands. Before the 9/11 strike against the U.S., Japan, located in East Asia like 
                                                 
2 Lin Chengyi, “Implications of the September 11th Events on the International Relations,” 
International Affairs Quarterly Publication 2 (2002): 2–26. 
3 Executive Yuan’s conference on strategic policies of internal security (natural disaster prevention, 
mobilization, counter terrorism) reorganized the Counter Terrorism Office as the Homeland Security Office, 
August 16, 2007. 
4 Ivan Sascha Sheehan, “Has the Global War on Terror Changed the Terrorist Threat? A Time-Series 
Intervention Analysis,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 8 (2009), 758. 
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Taiwan, had focused its territorial security system on preventing natural disasters. It was 
not until after the 9/11 attack that Japan began to face squarely the threats of terrorist 
attacks on its nation and people and began actively to establish its counterterrorism 
mechanism.5 Since terrorist attacks have rarely occurred in Taiwan, our ally countries’ 
experiences can provide valuable lessons for the Taiwanese government to review its 
own counterterrorism mechanisms. 
Taiwan has a long and close relationship with the U.S. and could be seen as a 
brother country of the U.S. by terrorists. The Taiwanese homeland could be a proxy 
setting for a chance to retaliate against an ally of the United States. It has been over 12 
years since the 9/11 terrorist attack. It is necessary for the Taiwanese government, in 
reference to the advantages of the major countries’ counterterrorism systems, to research 
and amend its related laws and organizations and build counter-terrorism mechanisms 
that meet Taiwan’s current situation and needs. Therefore, this thesis focuses on two 
dimensions. First, it reviews the current counterterrorism policies and operations and 
proposes a proper and complete counterterrorism strategy to effectively respond to 
terrorist attacks. Second, it provides suitable counterterrorism mechanisms and reminds 
decision-makers of the importance of establishing preventive measures in advance to 
ensure people’s lives, property, and national security.  
 PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES C.
There are two problems and hypotheses pertaining to this thesis, which are 
discussed in the following sections.  
1. The Draft Counterterrorism Law 
The damage caused by terrorist attacks in the international community has 
become more severe, and the injuries and the casualties are not limited to specific people 
or locations. So far, the office of Homeland Security in Taiwan, which is responsible for 
directing and promoting the various counter-terrorism organizations, is composed of 11 
                                                 
5 Fangyou Huang, “Study on Taiwan’s Anti-Terrorism System after 9/11 Attack in USA” (master’s 
thesis, National ChiaoTung University, 2007). http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/cgi-
bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi?o=dnclcdr&s=id=%22096NCTU5707011%22.&searchmode=basic. 
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people who are temporarily assigned there. Among those 11, seven are on loan from the 
National Security Agency, Department of National Defense, and police. One major issue 
regards authority. There is considerable doubt whether such organizations have the 
capability of planning and integrating the counter-terrorism mechanisms. Moreover, the 
draft counterterrorism law has not been passed, and the draft fails to designate the legal 
hierarchy of authority. When terrorist attacks take place in Taiwan, relevant organizations 
are unable to inform relevant authorities, investigate the incident, and follow up with first 
response rescue and recovery efforts in a short time. After two men suspected of carrying 
out the failed bombing attempts in northern Taiwan on April 12, 2013, Interior Minister 
Lee Hong-Yuan said that each department should reinforce national security authorities 
and other concerned government agencies in strengthening the country’s counterterrorism 
mechanism and action plans.6  If the Ministry of Justice can refer to related departments 
such as the National Security Bureau (NSB), military police, or police, to formulate the 
draft counterterrorism law as soon as possible and establish a competent authority to plan 
and direct the anti-terrorist operations, it will more efficiently and effectively prevent 
terrorist attacks.     
2. Integrating Intelligence Organizations 
The other issue concerns coordination. Taiwan’s counterterrorism structure and 
operation mechanisms are composed of the Executive and the Homeland Security system, 
a two-track system of mutual cooperation. Currently, only the intelligence organizations 
respond to incidents, but not the executive branch. Therefore, both organizations may not 
be able to coordinate well. Furthermore, intelligence units, which provide intelligence to 
the National Security Bureau, involve more bureaus, so the notification and management 
process is not as clear as the national security system. Notifying different bureaus is 
inefficient during a crisis.  
After the 9/11 incident, the U.S. intelligence system was completely reformed. In 
2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was passed. The act enables 
                                                 
6 Claudia Liu, Liu Shihyi, and Wu Sofia, “Taiwan to Tighten Anti-Terrorism Training: Minister,” 
Taiwan News, April 17, 2013. http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2198426.  
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National Intelligence Director (NID) to rule fifteen different systems of intelligence units 
and integrate the counterterrorism intelligence mechanism. 7  As for Japan, the 9/11 
incident and the incident of the North Korean spy ship’s invasion of Japan’s territorial sea 
exposed departmentalism of its intelligence authorities and conducted a thorough reform 
afterwards. All the intelligence from related authorities must be gathered at the Cabinet 
Intelligence Concentrated Center. The National Policy Agency, Ministry of Defense and 
Japan Coast Guard need to strengthen cooperation and joint drills and training in order to 
enhance Japan’s response mechanism to a major crisis.8 These two countries’ reformed 
intelligence systems can be good reference points for comparison for Taiwan’s system 
and in pursuit of the most appropriate counterterrorism intelligence mechanism. If the 
Homeland Security Office can be responsible for coordinating and integrating 
counterterrorism information and for providing counterterrorism intelligence to the 
Counterterrorism Action Group, the Executive Yuan, intelligence organizations, and 
related units, it will shorten the time of reporting intelligence and increase the capabilities 
of analyzing counterterrorism intelligence.  
 LITERATURE REVIEW D.
Research on counterterrorism has become a major focus of thought lately, and 
many countries have devoted an enormous amount of time to counterterrorism. This 
thesis surveys books that mainly relate to crisis management and counterterrorism, some 
essays and theses related to national security and terrorism published in the United States 
and Taiwan, and some websites related to terrorism. 
1. Books Related to Crisis Management and Counterterrorism 
Counterterrorism warfare is an important part of national crisis management. In 
Risk Management: Theory and Framework, Zhan Zhonguyan discusses the theory of 
crisis management and the dynamics of the crisis management planning process, 
                                                 
7 “National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004,” World News General, 
http://big5.cri.cn/gate/big5/gb.cri.cn/2201/2004/12/16/381@393561.htm.  
8 Wenling Hung, “A Comparative Study of Legal System in Anti-terrorism,” Central Police University 
Academy report no. 44, 2007. 
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including five steps and three phases. These are: detecting crisis signals; preparing for 
and preventing a crisis; damage control; the conduct of recovery; and constant learning 
and amending. He defines clearly what a crisis is and believes that decision makers’ 
capabilities of managing a crisis determine the consequences of a crisis. The continuity of 
the crisis follows different steps as it occurs:  prodromal crisis, acute crisis, chronic crisis, 
and crisis resolution. No crisis takes place abruptly and ends immediately. Therefore, the 
government should focus on management capability, including the formulation of crisis 
management policy and enforcement. 9   In addition, the author also compares and 
analyzes different countries’ crisis management systems from the viewpoint of disaster 
prevention, such as the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and 
Japan’s and Taiwan’s disaster risk management systems.  
Peter J. Katzenstein discusses Japan’s post 9/11 external and internal 
counterterrorism and national security policy and compares Japan’s counter-terrorism 
behavior with that of other Asian countries. 10   In, First Inventory of Policy on 
Counterterrorism: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United 
States – ‘Research in Progress,’ Rudie Neve, Lisette Vervoorn, Frans Leeuw, and Stefan 
Bogaerts analyze in detail the change of counter-terrorism laws. These authors also 
examine the functions of law enforcement authorities and intelligence units of the U.S., 
France, Italy, and Germany.11 All of these books provide good references for Taiwan in 
analyzing and comparing different counter-terrorism system and response mechanism.  
In another book, Crisis Thirty Six: The Analysis of Matrix Management Strategy, 
Zhan Zhongyuan uses a case-by-case analytical approach and adopts a five-category 
typology of crises: natural disaster, technological accident, traffic accident, man-made 
disaster, and regional conflict and war. These five types of crises were first proposed by 
the crisis management theorists Mayer Nudell and Norman Antokol in their Handbook 
                                                 
9 Zhongyuan Zhan, Risk Management-Theory and Framework (Taipei: Linking, 2004), 4.  
10 Peter J. Katzenstein, Rethinking Japanese Security Internal and External Dimensions (New York: 
Routledge, 2008).  
11 Rudie Neve, Lisette Vervoorn, Frans Leeuw and Stefan Bogaerts, First Inventory of Policy on 
Counterterrorism, Wetenschappelijk Onderzoeks- en Documentatiecentrum, Netherlands Ministry of 
Justice, Cahier 2006, 3a.  
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for Effective Emergency and Crisis Management, which collects 36 classic cases of 
domestic and international crisis management.12 These cases, especially the ones from 
Taiwan, have great reference value for the Taiwanese people. If crisis managers, in 
particular, can use matrix analysis well and handle the different stages of a crisis 
correctly, they will be better able to solve crises successfully.  
According to Harry Henderson, terrorist organizations are not just individuals or 
isolated groups; on the contrary, most of the time they are well-organized, well-planned, 
and well-financed organizations with tight networks. 13  In his book, the definition, 
concept, and factions of terrorism are introduced in detail. It also discusses the most 
harmful terrorist activities that have the greatest impact on societies from the perspective 
of international political scholars. The book also compares laws in different countries for 
dealing with terrorist behavior in detail and lists different types of terrorist organizations 
existing in the international society.  
The Study of Counterterrorism Risk Management Mechanisms by Qiu Jihe, Bu 
Zhengqiu, and Huang Hongguang analyzes crisis and terrorism and compares the crisis 
management and counterterrorism mechanisms in the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan. Taiwan 
can gain a lot of valuable insight from the book, which enhances the two-track structure 
between homeland security and the Executive Yuan indealing with terrorist attack 
incidents. The two-track system and the decision-making structure will modify and 
enhance counterterrorism-related behavior and implement the existing drills of the two 
systems of public order and disaster prevention. In order to increase the capability of the 
Taiwanese response to and management of counterterrorism, there are a few suggestions: 
(1) strengthen the intelligence informed mechanism between the National Security 
Council and the Executive Yuan; (2) strengthen the crisis informed mechanism in the 
Executive Yuan; (3) strengthen the Executive Yuan’s emergency decision-making 
mechanism; (4) separate and manage terrorist crisis incidents at different levels; (5) 
strengthen the counterterrorism force; (6) strengthen the drills for all types of terrorist 
                                                 
12 Zhongyuan Zhan, Crisis Thirty-Six: The Analysis of Matrix Management Strategy (Taipei: Huatai 
Culture, 2004). 
13 Harry Henderson, Global Terrorism: The Complete Reference Guide (New York: Checkmark 
Books, 2001), 1.  
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incidents; (7) strengthen Taiwan’s prevention and protection from poison, nuclear, 
biological, and chemical attack; (8) establish a roster for counterterrorism personnel; (9) 
enhance information technology network security; (10) moderately improve the criminal 
liability of terrorist activities; and (11) continue to strengthen international cooperation 
with counterterrorism efforts.14 
The Center for Counterterrorism Studies at the People’s Republic of China’s 
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations has sorted out the major 
counterterrorism laws and the United Nations’ counterterrorism international conventions 
and treaties. Counterterrorism experts Wang Fengming, Xia Hongzhi, and Li Huizhi, 
summarize their experiences in anti–terrorism operations, especially command 
experiences from the Afghanistan war, Russia’s Chechen war and the Moscow hostage 
incident. They discuss the counterterrorism command system, command methods, 
operations, procedures, principles, and the art of commanding and implementing the 
overall effectiveness of 1＋1＞2.15 
Wang Yuwei believes that international terrorism involves factors such as 
ideology, politics, religion, and culture. Hence military operations are only one method to 
combat terrorism. Besides military operation, it is necessary to conduct conversations 
between different civilizations, to respect different cultures, to promote diplomacy with 
constructive engagement, to conduct unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions, to 
reduce economic incentives for breeding terrorism, to collect intelligence and infiltrate 
terrorist organizations, and to strengthen the sanctions of the international convention.16  
In addition, Taiwan still needs assistance from international and regional 
organizations in establishing its counterterrorism mechanism and enforcing laws by the 
intelligence organizations. Generally speaking, common problems in international 
                                                 
14 Jie Qiu, Bu Zhengqiu, and Huang Hongguang, The Study of Anti-Terrorism Risk Management 
Mechanisms (Taipei: Research Development and Evaluation Committee, Executive Yuan, December 2002). 
15 Fengming Wang, Xia Hongzhi, and Li Huizhi, Anti-Terrorism Command (Beijing: People, 
September 2003), 1. 
16 Yuwei Wang, “Taiwan and the Global War on Terrorism,” The Thesis Album of Terrorism and 
National Security Seminar in the Police University, December 29, 2001, 41. 
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counterterrorism policy neglect to eliminate the root causes of terrorism and over-
emphasize military strikes. Counterterrorism in the international society should focus not 
only on real operations, but also on technology, law enforcement, counterterrorism sneak 
attacks, and hostage negotiations, which are micro-policy issues. However, research on 
macro-policy of counterterrorism has been neglected. It over-emphasizes striking terrorist 
forces with military forces and disregards the elimination of terrorism from the root. This 
thesis integrates the related research from scholars, seeking an appropriate 
counterterrorism mechanism based on Taiwan’s current situation and expecting to 
establish a sound system.   
2. Theses and Dissertations 
You Yueging argues that after the 9/11 incident, Taiwan’s government activated 
the national security mechanism, enforced the contingency measures and acts, and 
prevented the chain reaction of terrorist attacks that infiltrate and endanger national 
security. Although Taiwan is not the main target of terrorist attacks, it still cannot be 
excluded as a hiding location for terrorists or as a relay station for criminal activities. The 
threat of terrorism and the terrorist activities that damage Taiwan’s national security and 
economic benefit, and the increasing need for cooperation with international society to 
fight against terrorism requires that Taiwan seek a more effective policy to prevent and 
strike at terrorism. It is also a key moment for Taiwan to review and strengthen its 
existing structure and policy.17 
Chen Shuanghuan discusses in detail how Taiwan activates its national security 
mechanism and response measures when facing terrorist attacks. His research is a 
valuable reference for this thesis, which discusses Taiwan’s policy towards 
counterterrorism from the aspect of policy planning, operation mechanism, enforcement 
methods, counterterrorism capability, and international cooperation.18 Other articles, such 
as those by Zhen Zhennong, Liu Junsheng, and Cai Qingan offer a preliminary 
                                                 
17 Yueging You, “Terrorist Attack and Our Anti-Terrorist Strategy” (master’s thesis, University of 
Hsuan Chuang, 2009). 
18 Shuanghuan Chen, “The Study of Counterterrorism Mechanism in Taiwan” (master’s thesis, 
National Chengchi University, 2004).  
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understanding of the severe damage of terrorist activities, the terrorism phenomena and 
the status quo of counterterrorism in the international society.19   
3. Related Websites 
There are some web sources that are very helpful for researching the development 
of terrorism and counterterrorism and updating international counterterrorism behavior. 
These include the major newspapers and websites that report terrorist attacks and 
counterterrorism measures, such as Yahoo and Google, national laws and database 
websites and websites related to counterterrorism among international organizations. 
Moreover, a global terrorism report from the United States Department of State website 
in 2003 discussed other countries’ counterterrorism policies from different perspectives, 
such as diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and military. This report 
contains detailed assessments of foreign countries.20 
In brief, even though there are many articles, research, and books discussing 
counterterrorism issues, timeliness and trade-offs of the data are still problematic. 
Therefore, based on the research results from Taiwan and other countries, we discuss the 
problems and loopholes in Taiwan’s counterterrorism mechanism, hoping that a sound 
national security mechanism can be established.  
 METHODS AND SOURCES E.
For a long time, Taiwan has established its homeland security systems based on 
fighting the military threat from China. However, security threats do not just happen 
overseas. According to Cai Desheng, the chief of NSB in Taiwan, terrorism has begun to 
emerge domestically and members of terrorist organizations have become younger and 
                                                 
19 Zhennong Zhen, “Studies of the 9/11 Event and the Progress of Anti-terrorism” (master’s thesis, 
Management College, National Defense University, 2003); Junsheng Liu, “The Study on Constructing of 
ROC Homeland Security Mechanism‒in Both Division and Integration Approach” (master’s thesis, 
Chinese Culture University, 2004); Qingan Cai, “Influences of 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on the U.S. National 
Security Policy” (master’s thesis, Feng Chia University, 2004).  
20 U. S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, http://www.state.gov/. 
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more tech-savvy. 21  The situation might worsen if they possess weapons of mass 
destruction and endanger the security of population centers. Taiwan’s national security 
will be compromised if China adopts terrorist-like military strategies to conduct covert 
operations in Taiwan, and so Taiwan should prepare countermeasures to handle such 
situations.22    
By the end of the twentieth century, a country’s national security approach should 
not only focus on military power alone, but it should also expand its approach into 
different areas. To name a few, these include studying the theory and history of peace and 
war, understanding the threats pertaining to certain cultures and societies, studying the 
concept of regional, international, and global security, establishing security laws and 
systems, studying terrorism and drug dealing, understanding the impact of information 
technology, studying the decision-making process of crisis, national defense policy and 
its foundation, studying the nuclear strategic, weapon system and arms limitations and 
reductions, understanding regional security of the developing world, nationalism, and the 
proliferation of the sophisticated weapons. We can utilize the following research-based 
approach in understanding and devising countermeasures against terrorism.23 
The focus of this thesis is to adapt the national security approach, from the 
homeland security perspective in studying the security issues of national strategy and 
political system dimensions. This includes analyzing the national crisis management 
model, and complementing it with natural disaster relief and recovery experiences, the 
counterterrorism mechanism, laws, and operation mechanism, together with observation, 
induction, and the analysis of Taiwan’s current counterterrorism mechanism. The thesis 
incorporates an examination of domestic and foreign countries’ current counterterrorism 
mechanisms. By analyzing the crisis management models and the standard operating 
procedures of Taiwan, the United States, and Japan, we can analyze the effectiveness of 
                                                 
21  Sihao Chen, “In Response to Terrorism Domestically and More Tech-savvy, the National Security 
Bureau Urges the Anti-Terrorism Law be Enacted as soon as Possible,” Central Daily News, April 22, 2013. 
http://www.nownews.com/2013/04/22/91-2929419.htm. 
22  Bohao Qui and Wang Yunzhong, “The Discussion of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Policy,” 
Military Police Semiannual 61 (2005), 36–45. 
23 Mo Tahua, “Exploring the Security Studies Debate,” Issues and Studies 37, no.8a (1998), 19‒20. 
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Taiwan’s national security system and counterterrorist mechanism. Therefore, we can 
then offer useful suggestions for the government to enact related laws and regulations or 
revise its mechanism. The research methods are listed in the following paragraphs. 
1. Literature Analysis 
Domestic and foreign books, journals, papers, the Internet, and newspaper reports 
which are related to crisis management and operation help evaluate the crisis 
management model of the counterterrorism mechanism.  
2. Comparison 
Having a presidential system, the United States can respond more rapidly to 
emerging situations than parliamentary countries because a president is often less 
constrained than a prime minister.24  Before the 9/11 attack, the U.S. counterterrorism 
mechanism focused abroad; after 9/11, the U.S. turned its attention to the mainland. 
Moreover, the government has started to integrate related departments and established the 
Department of Homeland Security, which is responsible for counterterrorism. This 
reform demonstrates the president’s determination to establish a top to bottom 
mechanism. Japan is a country with a parliamentary system. The emperor is just the 
symbol of a state and does not hold real power. Since Japan has felt the threat of 
terrorism recently, it also realizes the importance of a crisis management mechanism 
which is led by the prime minister. The president shares executive power with the prime 
minister. Both the president and prime minster have legal authority to direct the operation 
of a counterterrorism mechanism; however, their command responsibilities could overlap 
one another. This is similar to Taiwan’s constitutional system. By analyzing these 
countries, we can be enlightened about their crisis management models and incident 
command systems. 
                                                 
24 “Presidential System,” Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidential_system.  
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3. Induction 
After analyzing literature and comparing other countries’ counterterrorism 
mechanisms, we can determine their merits and pitfalls and gauge the feasibility of our 
current mechanism in order to improve its operation.   
 THESIS OVERVIEW F.
The purpose of this research is to study Taiwan’s counterterrorism mechanisms. 
Chapter II describes the national security risk management models, types of terrorism and 
their current progress, the principles of counterterrorism, and the application of these 
principles to revise a nation’s counterterrorism mechanism and standard operating 
procedures. Chapter III discusses the counterterrorism mechanisms of the United States 
and Japan, which are used as references for improving Taiwan’s own counterterrorism 
model. Chapter IV examines whether the revised model is in compliance with existing 
Taiwanese regulations. Chapter V offers the conclusion and suggestions for further 
research.  
 
Figure 1. Research Project Framework.  
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II. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
The damage caused by a crisis affects the public’s social lives and derails society. 
The protection of public security and society’s stability encourage the government to 
solve the disorders of the society and reduce the loss caused by a crisis. Most of the time, 
a temporary ad hoc crisis management committee or institution deals with a crisis while 
the administrative officials are the leaders. Each bureau and its personnel and resources 
will be utilized by the crisis management committee or institution to deal with the event. 
One such crisis can be a terrorist attack and its resulting impact on individuals, society, 
and the country. Therefore, this chapter provides an overview of government crisis 
management methods and theory and then further discusses the development of 
counterterrorism and the implementation of the counterterrorist mechanism. 
 METHODS AND THEORY A.
Due to the uniqueness of each crisis, the management methods used in responding 
to these situations should be different from dealing with regular governmental issues.   
1. Definition of Crisis 
Terrorist attacks initiate a country’s crisis management; hence, it is necessary to 
understand what constitutes a crisis. The concept of crisis can be traced back to the 
ancient Greek era. Crisis in Greek, krimein, means “to decide.” Therefore, crisis can be 
explained as a decisive and critical moment. Webster defines crisis as the point of time 
when it is to be decided whether any affair or course of action must go on, or be modified 
or terminated; the decisive moment; the turning point.25Robert Heath believes that there 
are three key elements for handling a crisis: 1) gaining more time in which to make 
decisions and deploy resources effectively, 2) gaining more and better information, and 3) 
                                                 
25 Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd Ed. (New York: William Collins Publishers, 
1975), 432. 
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reducing the costs and losses involved. Heath believes that “disaster, urgent situation and 
crisis” are the same concept.26  
Zhan Zhongyuan included three common elements for a crisis:   
 Value Neutrality. Whether a crisis is resolved successfully depends on 
how it is managed. In addition to the nation’s operating mechanism, 
commander’s quick reactions are also an important factor to fight 
terrorism successfully.    
 Time Continuity. According to the crisis management expert Steven Fink, 
any crisis will have four stages, prodromal crisis, acute crisis, chronic 
crisis, and crisis resolution. No crisis takes place promptly and ends all of 
a sudden. Therefore, government should focus more on management 
ability, including policy making and implementation for crisis 
management. As for dealing with urgent incidents, it is in the stage of 
acute crisis that a commander’s clear understanding of the incidents, rather 
than technology, is required. 
 Responsibility and Freedom. Because of the essence of the first two 
elements, it is a decision maker’s responsibility to manage a crisis. 
Commanders cannot default on their responsibility due to the suddenness 
of a crisis. Furthermore, a decision maker’s responses during each phase 
of crisis must be positive and proactive. As matter of fact, when dealing 
with crisis, there should be more than one plan and commanders should 
have freedom to choose the best option.27 
2. Model of Crisis Management 
Robert Heath’s 4R model is reduction, readiness, response, and recovery. Using 
this model, decision makers should consider how to reduce the chance of crisis, how to 
be prepared to manage crisis, how to plan and train personnel to respond to a crisis 
situation, and how to recover quickly from it. Robert Heath believes that the 4Rs are the 
essence of the crisis management. Professor Ian I. Mitroff’s crisis management model 
includes five factors: crisis types/risks, crisis management mechanisms, systems, 
stakeholders, and crisis scenarios.28 
                                                 
26  Cheng Wang, trans., Crisis Management for Managers and Executives (London: Financial 
Times/Pitman, 1998), 11. 
27 Zhongyuan Zhan, Risk Management-Theory Structure (Taipei: Lianjing, 2004), 3‒5. 
28 Yongjun Chang, “For Crisis Prevention and Extension Planning Methods” (master’s thesis, 
Guangdong Technology, 2002), 10. 
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By contrast, Jay Nunamaker categorizes three stages of crisis development—
before the crisis erupted, during the crisis, and post crisis. 29  There are different 
management methods for each stage, as explained in the following sections. 
 Activities before a Crisis Erupts  a.
These activities are mainly to assist the authorities in predicting crisis 
scenarios and eliminating crises before they take place, including establishment of a crisis 
planning system, crisis training system, crisis sensor system, crisis knowledge data bank, 
and drill and rehearsal of crisis scenario.  
 Activities and Facilities during a Crisis b.
The activities mainly provide the crisis management team important 
information and resources. The facilities at which activities are carried out and resources 
are managed can be divided into three parts: 
1. Crisis command center: The center is in charge of assigning work. The 
crisis management center is composed of decision makers, aides, and a 
crisis response team, and crisis management expert. 
2. Crisis scenario monitor system: The system is in charge of tracing the 
development of the crisis and reporting to the decision makers in the 
command center.  
3. Crisis source management system: This system is in charge of 
distributing and allocating sources that are needed when solving a 
crisis.  
  
                                                 
29 Jay F. Nunamaker, Jr., Sue E. Weber, and Minder Chen, “Organizational Crisis Management 
Systems: Planning for Intelligence Action,” Journal of Management Information Systems 5, no. 4 (March 
1989), quoted in Zhongyuan Zhan, Risk Management-Theory Structure (Taipei: Lianjing, 2004), 19‒22. 
 18
3. Activities after a Crisis Is Resolved 
At this stage, it is important to evaluate the facilities and their performance and 
further provide the result as a reference to the current crisis management process. The 
main tasks are:  
 Establish an evaluation and investigation system and confirm the cause of 
the crisis. 
 Speed up the recovery project. 
 Continue to promote next crisis management plan.30 
No matter what type of model of crisis management system, the government 
should always consider the three stages of crisis development and also always follow the 
four steps of crisis management—reduction, readiness, response, and recovery.  
 APPLICATION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT  B.
The essence of a crisis is the eruption of major danger. Therefore, it is a challenge 
to manage or deal with crisis incidents. Using the four steps of crisis management—
reduction, readiness, response, and recovery—to establish a complete crisis management 
mechanism can effectively prevent injuries to military when operating. Therefore, based 
on Zhan Zhongyuan’s perspective on crisis management, we suggest the establishment of 
a complete crisis management mechanism to prevent terrorist attacks and reduce 
accidents when conducting anti-terrorist activities. This crisis management mechanism 
should address the four steps as follows:31 
1. Reduction before Crisis Eruption 
This step includes measures to eliminate and decrease the possibilities of accident 
and also evaluate the crisis. For example, such tasks are organizing a variety of disaster 
prevention drills and rehearsal and establishing think tanks for crisis management. 
                                                 
30 Zhan, Risk Management-Theory Structure, 20–22. 
31 Zhan, Risk Management-Case Study (Taipei: Shenzhou, 2003), 45.  
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 Readiness before Crisis Eruption  a.
In order to develop the capabilities of quick response to a crisis, this step 
focuses on planning and prevention. For example, activities include checking and 
updating equipment and tools used in disaster rescue and prevention, and enhancing the 
rescue team’s knowledge of crisis through training.  
 Response during Crisis b.
Instant response is required at this step. For example,tasks include search 
and rescue, building a quick response mechanism, finding the cause of an accident, and 
dealing with unexpected incidents.  
 Recovery after Crisis  c.
The key for this step is the protection in the short term and the recovery in 
the long run. It includes, for example, aid and assistance, care and consulting, and 
recognition of offers of assistance, as well as collecting different opinions and holding a 
meeting to review the recovery activities.  
In conclusion, the best strategy to deal with crisis is to detect the 
symptoms at the earliest stage and prevent it from happening. Otherwise, it will be more 
difficult to handle later on and the price to be paid for handling the crisis could be higher. 
As a matter of fact, the reduction stage is the most important one because prevention is 
the best cure and the cost of solving a crisis will be reduced to a minimum. This thesis 
proposes a crisis management approach, which is composed of different modules that are 









1. Build the concept of crisis evaluation. 
2. Hold and participate in drills and rehearsals for disaster prevention. 
3. Establish a think tank to respond to crisis management. 
Readiness 
1. Enhance equipment supply and maintenance.  
2. Increase rescue team’s professional knowledge of crisis through   
    training. 
Response 
1. Search the site and rescue. 
2. Build a response mechanism. 
3. Find the cause of the incident. 
4. Deal with unexpected incidents. 
Recovery 
1. Emphasize consultation.  
2. Collect opinions and hold a meeting for review afterwards. 
3. Pass on the rescue experiences.  
Table 1.   Different Stages of Crisis Management. 
In brief, good crisis management system focuses not on handling an 
already erupted crisis, but on observing in advance the existence of crisis warning signals 
and dealing with them properly to lower the risk as much as possible. Therefore, during 
the incubation period before the crisis takes place, we should be prepared for it as if it is 
happening. In addition, to increase our own capability to battle the crisis, we should also 
be completely prepared for a crisis once it happens. 
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 DEVELOPING TRENDS OF TERRORISM C.
Since the end of the Cold War, the prevalence of terrorism is a main factor 
causing turmoil in the world.32 As a matter of fact, terrorist activities took place in both 
the 1970s and 1980s, and since the 1990s, 33  almost all countries have experienced 
different levels of terrorist attacks. The targets have switched from specific groups to the 
general public. Furthermore, attack methods have changed from the use of traditional 
guns and bombs to weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical 
weapons.34 Facing the increasing threat of terrorism, it is necessary for us to understand 
what terrorism is, how it is defined, as well as how it originated, what types exist, and 
what their characteristics are. We must also understand the possibility of developing 
trends in terrorism. 
1. Definition of Terrorism 
The United Nations convened experts in 1973 and attempted to define terrorism. 
However, there was no one good definition that could be made and discussion eventually 
ceased in 1974. In recent years, the U.N. reattempted to define terrorism and has released 
several related reports on this issue, but still failed to define it. The reason it is difficult to 
define the concept of terrorism is because of its intricate patterns, subjectivity, and 
relativity. The following are definitions of terrorism from different sources. 
 Encyclopedia Britannica a.
Terrorism is the systematic use of violence to create a general climate of 
fear in a population and thereby to bring about a particular political objective. Terrorism 
has been practiced by political organizations, by nationalistic and religious groups, by 
                                                 
32 Shaojun Li, “The Delimitation of the Concept of Terrorism,” in The Origins of Terrorism, ed. 
Yizhou Wang (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2002), 1. 
33 In fact, the first international terrorism event occurred in 1968. Three terrorists of PFLP hijacked the 
plane of Israel Airline El A1 to Algeria. After extensive negotiation, the terrorists eventually released the 
passengers, flight crew, and the plane. Henceforth, international hijacking has become common terrorism 
operations. Quoted and interpreted from Zhongyong Zhang, “The Evolution and Development of 
International Terrorism,” Strategy and International Research 4, no. 1 (January 2002), 2. 
34 Walter Laqueur, “The New Face of Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1998). 
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revolutionaries, and even by state institutions such as armies, intelligence services, and 
police.35 
 Taiwan’s Action against Terrorism Act Draft Article II b.
Terrorism is an act perpetrated by an individual or organization based on 
political, religious, racial, ideological, or other specific beliefs and is intended to cause 
the public to feel fear. Terrorist organizations, referring to three or more actors, have an 
internal management structure for the purpose of engaging in organized terrorist acts. 
Terrorism is not limited to the act itself, but also includes financing, planning, and 
logistics for the organization. 
 Department of State c.
According to Title 22 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 2656f 
(d), the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience.36 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI d.
Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “the unlawful 
use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, 




                                                 
35 Contemporary International Relations Institute of Anti-Terrorism Research Center, International 
Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Struggle (Beijing: China Culture, 2001), 3. 
36 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996, Chapter 1. 
37 John Pynchon Holms, Terrorism (New York: Pinnacle, 1994), 13. 
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 Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt e.
für Verfassungsschutz, BfV, 1985) 
Terrorism is the enduring struggle for political goals which are intended to 
be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by 
means of severe crimes (murder, homicide, extortionist kidnapping, arson, setting off a 
blast by explosives), or by means of other acts of violence, which serve as preparation of 
such criminal acts. 
To conclude from all the definitions, terrorism is “an instrument of 
individuals, groups or nations who use violent actions to provoke fear, anxiety, and 
restlessness; terrorists are selective with targets that they choose but their goal may 
actually be to convey a message to the media; terrorism demands will determine the 
purpose of the group and may be taken by way of terrorist activities.38 
2. History of Terrorism 
 Terrorism before World War II a.
In the first century AD, in order to fight against the Roman Empire’s 
invasion, Jewish fanatical partisans poisoned the drinking water and assassinated Jewish 
nobles who cooperated with Romans, which is similar to the methods of some current 
terrorists. The term “terrorism” first appeared in the French Revolution in the eighteenth 
century. The ruling party, Jacobin, decided to use Red Terror against 
counterrevolutionaries in order to protect the new regime. It is not difficult to see that 
terrorism is not a general, isolated, and occasional act of terror, but rather refers to 
organized, institutional, and political terrorist activities. Before World War II, terrorist 
activities were mainly focused on assassinations and poisoning.  
 Terrorism after World War II b.
In the 1960s, terrorist activities took place mainly in the colonies, 
dependencies, or newly independent nation states such as the IRA in Northern Ireland. 
                                                 
38 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman (eds.), Political Terrorism (Amsterdam: North- Holland 
Publishing Company, 1988), 33‒34. 
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During this period of time, terrorist incidents increased rapidly and the methods were 
various, hijacking, explosion, kidnapping, and holding of hostages. The targets and 
scopes had gone beyond boundaries and had become more international and gradually 
became international terrorist activities. Between 1964 and 1980, terrorism was always 
used to describe violent left-wing groups. For instance, the Red Army Faction belonged 
to this group.39  After 1970s, terrorist organizations had formed a loose international 
network and they focused on political targets such as political and industrial leaders. In 
the 1980s, the focus of terrorists included not only politics but also religious and 
economic interests that targeted Western aircraft, industry, political leaders, and the 
judicial system of various countries. New terrorist organizations arose in the 1990s, and 
terrorist activities have grown gradually since then. They focus mainly on financial 
centers, transportation, resources, systems of justice, media, and certain individuals.40 
Terrorist activities take place covertly and are very destructive; hence, it has been hard to 
prevent these activities which caused great harm to people and property.     
In the international arena, terrorism is usually seen as a justification for 
powerful countries to sponsor a small country’s war and military actions. Clearly, the 
definition of terrorism has been changing in the past hundred years. Until today, the term 
terrorists has been used to describe an independent group, violent religious fanatics, and 
some violent groups with specific ideologies such as protecting the environment.  
3. Types of Terrorism 
To view terrorism from an actor’s point of view, it can be categorized into two 
types: non-governmental and governmental. Governmental terrorism is also called 
national terrorism and can also be divided into two types: domestic or international. 
However, non-governmental terrorism is the type that prevails in the world today and 
which international society has been trying to fight. Non-governmental terrorism includes 
                                                 
39 Rolf Clemens Wagner, “Thoughts on the End of the Red Army Faction (RAF),” Jungle World, May 
13, 1998, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/61/206.html.  
40 Roger Medd and Frank Goldstein, “International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium,” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 20, no. 3 (July-September 1997), 281. 
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the behavior of a group or an individual, and can also be divided into international and 
domestic terrorist activities.41 
Scholars define types of terrorism on different bases, such as political motivation, 
terrorist behavior, and activities’ scope. For example, Zhang Zhongyong, a scholar from 
Taiwan, analyzes motivations and types of international terrorism and categorizes them 
into five types:42 
 Political Awareness a.
Terrorism that is based on the political awareness not only includes left-
wing and right-wing extremists’ organizations, it also includes the countries that use a 
particular political ideology to harbor or support terrorism. 
 Religious Fanaticism b.
Religious fanatics are motivated by religious ideology or a sense of sacred 
duty. Some prominent examples of such groups are the Islamic Shiah and the Aum 
Shinrikyo (currently known as Aleph). 
 Separation Movement  c.
The Separation Movement involves groups all over the world, who 
distinguish themselves from others along the lines of nationalism, racism, cultural 
identity, and religious belief.  
 Racial Exclusion d.
Racial exclusion can be a motivation for terrorism in a society with higher 
economic development and significant economic inequality. When local workers’ income 
or job opportunities are taken away by immigrants, the local workers can experience 
dissatisfaction and frustration, thus setting the conditions for ethnicity to occur. In 
                                                 
41 Mingming Wang, “The Types of Modern Terrorism,” in The Origins of Terrorism, ed. Yizhou 
Wang (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2002), 43‒74. 
42Zhongyong Zhan, “The Evolution and Development of International Terrorism,” Strategic and 
International Study 4, no. 1 (2002), 22‒42. 
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addition, superior consciousness or cultural chauvinism can be possible factors that 
would cause exclusion.  
 Radical Issues e.
When a society’s economic development and pace of social change cannot 
do not keep pace with each other, there will be a conflict between social beliefs and 
concepts of value that further leads to extreme methods of protest. Among the issues 
related to conflicting social values are those related to nuclear energy, hunting and 
protection of endangered species, overdevelopment, abortion, etc.   
John Deutch, an American scholar, distinguishes three types of terrorist 
acts: terrorist activities supported by the government, which are also the most dangerous 
ones, such as activities by Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria; 
terrorist activities whose goal is to overthrow its own government or to become 
independent; and terrorist activities that are supported by Islamic groups.43 
After researching in detail about terrorism, we categorize terrorist acts 
based on activity scope and motivation. There are three types of terrorism for activity 
scope: domestic, national, and international. And there are four types of terrorism in 
terms of motivation: nationalism, religious fanatics, criminal, and extremist. See Table 2 








                                                 
43 John Deutch, “Terrorism,” Foreign Policy 109 (1997), 10‒22. 
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behavior against another 
country’s people in 
peace time. 
The September 11 
attacks by the Islamic 
terrorists  
National Terrorism 
A country’s terrorist 
methods against another 
country. 
The Irish Republican 




terrorist methods within 
the country to rule its 
country. 
The federal building 
in Oklahoma City was 




National pride and 
identity that lies outside 
the sovereign nation of 
which a group is a part. 






A sect of society that 
feels their religion 
compels them to take up 
arms against non-
followers. 
Aum Shinri Kyo, 
Hamas 
Criminal Terrorism Economic incentive. Italian Mafia 
Extremist Terrorism Groups that strive for political revolutions. 
Action Directe; Rote; 
Aemee Fakion; The 
Order; Ku Klux Klan. 
Table 2.   Types of Terrorism. 
  
 28
4. Future Developing Trends of Terrorism 
Future terrorist acts are going to continue to threaten human beings. The former 
Secretary of State Colin Powell pointed out on November 18, 2002, when meeting with 
teenage students that there are still many doctrines in the world, and the one that is 
threatening people is not communism anymore but terrorism. What Powell said brings 
out the fact that there will be a long period of time in history during which terrorist 
activities will rage in the world because of all kinds of conflicts domestically and 
internationally.  
The reasons why terrorist acts are growing and getting more destructive are 
complicated. On one hand, because of the development of new technology, some skills or 
techniques that only powerful countries have can now be accessed more easily by 
terrorists. Terrorists can obtain more destructive weapons at a lower price. On the other 
hand, because of the rapid growth of globalization and modernization, the world’s 
communication and interaction have reached an unprecedented level. Industrialized 
countries with more advanced information technology demonstrate their prosperity and 
power; meanwhile, they also expose their weaknesses in front of terrorists.44 
Because of the new technology, convenient transportation, and ease of access to 
information, the world has become a global village. The future development of terrorism 
can be predicted as follows:  
 Growing trend of globalization in terrorism.  
 More covert form of organization.  
 Uncertainty of targets of terrorist activities. 
 Terrorist activities are more threatening, more destructive, and more 
diverse.  
 More types of terrorist organizations.  
 The use of computer to carry out terrorist activities is more obvious.  
 The severity and scope of destruction have increased.45  
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Based on these predictions, governments can create a model to help prevent 
terrorist attacks. 
The characteristics of current terrorism vary with the composition of its members, 
the support source, activity range, target, and the level of influence. Terrorists are always 
beyond a country’s boundaries; as a result, cross-border cooperation or crimes are 
common. In other words, the threat and impact of terrorist activities are greater and the 
methods of prevention and the investigation are more difficult. Facing the trend of 
internationalization and transnational terrorism, it is more important to enhance the 
capability and role of counterterrorism intelligence, so that a country can be better able to 
deal with the challenge of international terrorism.   
 COUNTERTERRORISM COMMAND MECHANISM AND ITS ROLE D.
A counterterrorism command mechanism is a mechanism to distribute and 
integrate different units and rule the relationship between them. An efficient 
counterterrorism command mechanism can be either centralized or decentralized and has 
an acute structure of command. 46  In brief, a complete counterterrorism mechanism 
contains a complete organization, a sound command relationship, and good regulation.    
1. Types of Counterterrorism Mechanisms 
Due to the needs of the counterterrorism war, all countries build their own 
mechanisms of counterterrorism. Basically there are two types of command: centralized 
command and decentralized command. Centralized command is the most common; it is 
also called “a whip.” The advantages of centralized command are easily grasped ideas 
and harmonization. The disadvantages of centralized command are a lack of horizontal 
connections and communications, which leads to difficulty in coordination and 
integration, single sourcing, information provided by only superiors, strong reliance on 
vertical communication, poor continuity when communication is disrupted, and the 
inability of subordinates to make judgments and decisions. Decentralized command has 
independent contact points without interaction and connections. In this model, team 
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members carry out activities based on their own superiors’ decisions. The advantages to 
this model are independence, autonomy, decisiveness, and the ability to control a 
situation immediately. The disadvantages are that all organizations responding to a 
terrorist threat differ greatly and a lack of counterpart understanding means inefficiencies 
in the system, and a lack of integration which leads to fighting terrorists independently. 
The current counterterrorism command is a combination of centralized and 
decentralized command. Centralized command is used on a large scale for greater impact 
on counterterrorism activities, such as large scale hostage situations. Decentralized 
command is used for small scale or less significant counterterrorism activities, such as a 
small scale explosion. Each country has different command systems due to its own 
situation and type of regime. 47  The 9/11 incidents revealed the loopholes of the 
counterterrorism mechanism and miscommunications between countries and different 
authorities. It made countries review the mechanism and amend the weaknesses.  
In this section, we compare the differences and similarities between the U.S. and 
Japanese counterterrorism mechanisms. Even though they are different systems and have 
different titles for each organization, their functions are basically similar to each other. 
For example, like the National Security Council, there are similar mechanisms such as 
communicating, negotiating, and integrating through think tanks that provide suggestions 
to leaders. However, there is no specific answer on whether or not the mechanisms need a 
specific unit to manage related issues. It is more important that there will be a unit to play 
a key role to integrate all the units. The most important factor when dealing with a 
terrorist attack is to grasp the situation fast and to give clear command and control, so 
that the policy can be carried through thoroughly. Both the U.S. presidential system and 
Japan’s cabinet system integrate the commanding unit when dealing with major crisis or 
making important decisions. Analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of the Japanese 
and U.S. counterterrorism command mechanism will provide a good reference for 
Taiwan.  
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2. Future Trends of Counterterrorism Command Mechanism 
An organization could be more efficient by integrating technology into its 
structure and plan and if it organizes its command structure based on these technologies. 
The future trend of counterterrorism mechanisms could be separated into two parts:48 See 
Figure 2, 3. 
 
Figure 2. A Hierarchical Mesh of a Command System. 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 21‒22. 
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Figure 3. A Comprehensive Mesh of a Command System. 
The first command system is similar to Taiwan’s joint combat model between 
different branches, and the second command system is a joint combat model of all the 
branches that are integrated together. The counterterrorism command mechanism must be 
based on technology and the capability of integrating technology between organizations 
for warfare. There are three advantages for this command mechanism: increased speed of 
command; ensured meaningful existence of the organizations; and a flexible response 
system of the organizations. The types of terrorist attacks have evolved and renewed 
gradually; therefore, only by increasing technology can one prevent and deal with all 
types of terrorist attacks. Counterterrorism mechanisms should always be designed in 
accordance with this rule in order to be successful.   
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III. AMERICAN COUNTERTERRORISM MECHANISM 
The purpose of crisis management is to assist the government in forming a 
complete policy to prevent crises and further to deal with crises quickly, manage losses 
from crises, and recover from crises. Since the end of the 1960s, terrorist activities in the 
U.S. focused mainly on its military facilities overseas, foreign institutions, or personnel. 
Therefore, the counterterrorism mechanism must also focus on overseas security. The 
first terrorist attack on U.S. territory was the explosion of New York World Trade Center 
in February 1993. The U.S. started to discuss the policy and prevention of terrorism 
within the territory at that time.  
The 9/11 incident led to the large scale adjustment and amendment of U.S. 
counterterrorism mechanisms. The incident was a big shock to the world. That such a 
large scale of terrorist attack took place in America, the main country that fights against 
terrorists, forced the U.S. government to examine its counterterrorism mechanisms. 
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) reports, the U.S. 
counterterrorism system and measures still have problems that need to be solved. They 
discovered that U.S. counterterrorism strategies were not so well founded, especially in 
the field of collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence; coordinating and integrating 
between organizations; border security check and immigration control; aviation transport 
security management; and major disaster management.49  Therefore, Congress passed 
various bills or adopted amendments to strengthen the counterterrorism effort, moved the 
focus of counterterrorism from overseas to domestic territory, and established the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be responsible for the counterterrorism 
mission. The purpose of all these changes was to overcome parochialism among agencies 
and to establish a unified structure of power for “homeland security.” Meanwhile, the  
9/11 incident also spurred other countries to examine their counterterrorism mechanisms, 
reinforce their related regulations and laws, and reform their intelligence organizations.  
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In the following chapters, we analyze the U.S. and Japan’s response to the 9/11 
incident and discuss Taiwan’s future possible development in the field of 
counterterrorism. These two countries use different systems: the U.S. has a presidential 
system, and the president is the core of the system; Japan uses a cabinet system and the 
main authority is the premier. These two countries’ systems offer a good basis for 
comparison for Taiwan because Taiwan adopts a dual executive system/semi-presidential 
system. No matter which system, crisis management still focuses on centered decision 
making. The decision making bureaucracy is the core organization in charge of making 
security policy, integrating intelligence, and dealing with crisis and eliminating the 
possibilities of crisis.50  
 DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMATION OF COUNTERTERRORISM A.
MECHANISMS 
1. The Basis of Counterterrorism Legislation 
 The National Security Act a.
Among U.S. laws, there are many that apply to crisis management. The 
most important one is the National Security Act of 1947.  “The National Security Act of 
1947 mandated a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments 
of the U.S. Government.” The act serves not only as a reference for the president when 
dealing with national security affairs, but also as the basis of the national security 
organizations, national defense system, and national security system. “The act created 
many of the institutions that presidents found useful when formulating and implementing 
foreign policy, including the National Security Council (NSC).”51  The NSC was placed 
in the Executive Office of the President, and small group of the NSC was hired to 
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the act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established to serve as the primary 
civilian intelligence-gathering organization, and the Defense Intelligence Agency was 
responsible for the main military intelligence in the government.52    
 The National Emergencies Act b.
This act was passed in 1976. It gives the president power to declare a 
national emergency when there is an emergency situation meeting the federal regulations. 
During states of emergency, the president can exercise the special executive powers to 
issue a number of regulations. Once the emergency stops, these regulations will lapse. 
When a national emergency is declared because of a foreign threat, the president can 
under the Act, exercise the special power to limit international payments and money, 
securities and property transfer. Besides the National Emergencies Act, each state has 
State Emergency Act, and the governor or the mayor is empowered to declare an 
emergency in accordance with the act. For example, Cincinnati, Ohio, was declared an 
emergency on April 12, 2001 due to African Americans’ protest against the police. A 
state or a city could declare an emergency because of severe weather such as a storm or 
hurricane.  
 The Counterterrorism Act c.
The Congress passed the Counterterrorism Act in 1996 and regulated that 
the president must use all necessary means, including covert action and military power to 
suspend and destroy international terrorist base facilities. The 9/11 terrorist attacks 
caused great damage and injuries; hence, the U.S. Congress passed the amendment to the 
Counterterrorism Act to increase the power of the U.S. Federal law enforcement 
institution. On October 26, 2001, then President George W. Bush signed the 
Counterterrorism Act, which is also called the Patriot Act, and made it official law to 
fight against terrorism. President Bush believed that the Counterterrorism Act would 
provide law enforcement units a method to fight against terrorism while protecting the 
constitutional rights of American citizens. The U.S. government implemented the act as if 
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it were a nation at war. Implementing the act has not only helped the U.S. government 
deal with current threats but also to destroy and punish terrorists before they can initiate 
any attack.  
2. Development and Innovation of the Counterterrorism Bill  
The U.S. started implementing relevant legislation long before the 9/11 incident 
took place; for example, in 1992, a law was passed to authorize the FBI to investigate any 
attack on Americans overseas and to arrest terrorists and criminals that violate U.S. law 
and extradite them back to the U.S. to stand trial. On April 1996, the Counterterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act was passed to increase punishment on those who launch 
or finance terrorist activities and also to standardize the regulation of biological warfare 
agents. Also in 1996, the Immigration and Nationality Act was amended to increase U.S. 
immigration officials’ power to expel and repatriate those who are involved in terrorist 
activities and to reduce the opportunity to grant amnesty for terrorists. Even though there 
have been laws to prevent terrorists from endangering the U.S., it was not until the 9/11 
incident that the U.S. government became aware of the shortcomings and insufficiency of 
its counterterrorism act. Since then, the U.S. began to amend its laws and bills; however, 
there has been dispute regarding which takes precedence the protection of citizens’ 
constitutional rights or the protection of people’s lives and property safety. The following 
are brief description of some of the more important acts. 
 The Patriot Act  a.
Within a week of the 9/11 incident (September 18, 2001), the Senate and 
the House of Representatives passed a resolution to authorize the use weapons and also 
passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (U.S. Patriot Act) on October 26. 53  On 
November 13, 2001, a military order was released and soon became an important 
reference for other countries’ counterterrorism legislation. The Patriot Act reduces the 
legal restrictions on intelligence gathering, expands the finance department’s norms of 
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foreign financial transactions, especially for individuals and entities, and expands 
immigration laws on detention and repatriation of terrorist suspects. In this act, the 
definition of terrorists also includes the nation’s terrorists. The Patriot Act authorizes 
intelligence units to investigate terrorist activities and enforce laws. Due to the National 
Security and Counterterrorism Act, the intelligence units can place surveillance on any 
individuals and organizations, such as collecting communications records and content, 
personal information such as firearms purchase records, bank accounts or library records, 
etc. The Act content is divided into a total of ten issues: Enhancing Domestic Security 
Against Terrorism, Enhanced Surveillance Procedures, International  Money Laundering 
Abatement and Antiterrorist Financing Act of 2001, Protecting the Border, Removing 
Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism, Providing for Victims of Terrorism, Public Safety 
Officers, and Their Families, Increased Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism, Improved Intelligence, 
and Miscellaneous.54  Also, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, referred to as the 9/11 Committee, was established and its members can 
investigate related important personnel, documents, and confidential information. A final 
report was released in July 2004 containing 41 recommendations on preventing future 
terrorist attacks, strengthening domestic security, gathering intelligence and on foreign 
policy.55 The U.S. government began the legislation accordingly. The Patriot Act is a 
Sunset Clause, and on May 26, 2011, President Obama extended three proposals again 
for four years; the first one is the “roving wiretaps” power, which authorizes monitoring 
the foreign suspects’ telephone communications. The second one is the “library 
provision.” It is an Act that allows the government access to personal records of terrorist 
suspects. The third one is the “lone wolf” provision which authorizes the government to 
investigate individual terrorists unrelated to terrorist organizations.56 The purpose of this 
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Act is to prevent terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 incident from happening again, but 
because the bill authorized access to personal data and allowed monitoring the content 
network and telephone communications, there is still controversy between the balance of 
security and civil rights. 
 Counterterrorism Act of 2001  b.
The Counterterrorism Act was passed in September 2001 which would 
authorize the U.S. 94 Federal Prosecutor to order the Department of Justice, Department 
of the Treasury, and Department of State to use the system to detect crime. On October 
25 of the same year, the Counterterrorism Act Amendment was passed. It strengthened 
the U.S. government’s law enforcement power. Under the Act, the Department of Justice 
has the right to permanently detain non-U.S. citizens who are involved in terrorist 
activities in the U.S. prison. On May 8, 2002, the Senate modified the Alien Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, to broaden its scope for electronic-related surveillance requirements. 
This enabled the FBI to conduct monitoring of foreigners, not limited to those only 
related to terrorist organizations, or foreign intelligence workers. In addition, the 
intelligence agencies now had the right to investigate suspects and their lawyers could 
provide testimony to the federal jury. After the 9/11 incident, Congress revised the Act 
several times, and it currently requires the Department of Justice to review each non-US 
citizen’s custody in the United States every six months and to complete a written report 
to Congress.57    
 Homeland Security Act c.
Congress passed the Homeland Security Act in 2002, and the term 
homeland security was well-known to the world after the September 11 attack. The term 
was clearly defined and its function and purpose was determined. On the basis of the 
definition of homeland security, homeland security strategy set three strategic objectives: 
integration of all national forces to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States; reduce 
America’s vulnerability in regard of terrorism; reduce losses to a minimum when an 
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attack happens and recover from the attack. The same year in July, the Office of 
Homeland Security (OHS) announced a National Strategy for Homeland Security. The 
Department of Homeland Security was established in order to integrate a variety of 
homeland security-related issues and matters, to ensure the border and aviation security, 
and to strengthen the U.S. ability to combat terrorism. 
 Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 d.
The Act, also be called Patriot II or Son of Patriot, is an extension of the 
U.S. Patriot Act. However, this Act, like the 2001 Patriot Act, is still controversial in 
regard to human rights and freedoms versus the government need for intelligence 
gathering. In April 3, 2003, the Department of Justice drafted a “2003 terrorist 
identification method,” for the effective discovery, search, chase, and prevention 
corresponding to terrorist actions. With the passage of this Act, the U.S. law enforcement 
agencies were able to invoke the law to force gathering suspects’ DNA for archiving 
management.  
On August 3, 2007, then President Bush signed an additional act to 
strengthen government’s counterterrorism measures. The Domestic Security 
Enhancement Act takes advice from the 9/11 Incident Investigation Commission’s report 
of July 2004 and provides 41 foreign policy suggestions in regards to preventing future 
terrorist attacks, strengthening domestic security, and intelligence gathering. The Federal 
security fund will be allocated depending on each state and each city’s risk index; the 
higher index will have a higher allocation. In addition, the government was urged to build 
a new system for the purpose of reliable communication between all security personnel, 
at all levels. The recommended provisions included constructing a new connection 
system, reinforcing railway, transportation and bus security, and creating a new electronic 
travel authorization system to strengthen security review of travelers from visa-free 
countries.58  
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 OPERATIONS OF THE COUNTERTERRORISM DECISION-MAKING B.
MECHANISM 
The core of the U.S. crisis management mechanism is the President of the United 
States, the overall governance capacity as the basis, the National Security Council as the 
decision-making center, State Department, Defense Department, and Justice Department 
cooperate and responsible for nation’s security.59 Through legal means, a complete crisis 
response plan, an efficient central coordinating mechanism, and a crisis response network 
are all included in the national security system. How the House of Representatives and 
the Senate authorized the president, how the decision-making mechanism was formed, 
and how to coordinate between various departments are all clearly described. Thus, when 
the United States, with a national security system led by the president, encounters 
terrorist attacks, the crisis management operations start automatically. The most 
important operation institutions are the Department of Homeland Security, the National 
Security Council, and the temporary crisis decision-making special teams, which provide 
the President with the best strategies to make decisions on national security issues.  
1. President’s Commanding Authority 
The U.S. President is the Commander in Chief, as well as the core of the U.S. 
which was authorized power by the Constitution. If the country is under threat, the 
president has to take all the measures to protect the nation’s security.  
Besides exercising the legal power of the president of the country, with respect to 
the legislative power of the Congress, the president also has power on the administrative 
level. Although the U.S. has a presidential system, under the constitutional norm, the 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers are balanced. As long as the president’s act is 
based on administrative regulation, his decision-making power will not be challenged. 
This also ensures that the presidential system will operate smoothly. The best example of 
the system is that after President George W. Bush publicly declared the 9/11 series of  
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attacks as “acts of war,” it was immediately possible to seek Congress’ consent to allow 
the president to use all necessary force and means to curb the expansion of terrorist 
attacks and to fight back against terrorists. 
2. Department of Homeland Security 
Before the 9/11 incident occurred, the definition of national security was only 
limited to outside the U.S. Since the incident, the U.S. government and the people have 
completely changed the concept of the local defense.60  The 9/11 incident not only 
provided an opportunity to accelerate reform and to break the status quo of homeland 
security, but also prompted the U.S. government to eliminate administrative territorialism 
drastically and establish a newly unified “homeland security” institutional structure. Six 
months after the incident, President Bush announced the establishment of the Office of 
Homeland Security as he explained his concept of homeland security: “The changing 
nature of the threats facing America requires a new government structure to protect 
against invisible enemies that can strike with a wide variety of weapons. Today no one 
single government agency has homeland security as its primary mission. In fact, 
responsibilities for homeland security are dispersed among more than 100 different 
government organizations.” 61   Thus, in June 2002, the House of Representatives 
Committee on Government Reform passed a motion to establish the Department of 
Homeland Security, which represented the largest government reorganization plan since 
1947, when the U.S. Department of Defense was established. This is a government 
reorganization plan that integrates the existing 22 federal government agencies, including 
17 million personnel. Its annual budget is approximately $40 billion. The department is 
mainly responsible for protecting the United States from terrorist threats, analyzing 
terrorist threats, protecting the borders, airports and critical infrastructure, and 
coordinating national emergency response for the future. In addition, the Department of 
Homeland Security coordinates the provision of local defense forces, and is committed to  
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protecting the rights of American citizens, strengthening public services, and in the face 
of natural disasters, providing help and services. See Figure 4 for an overview of the 
organization of the Department of Homeland Security. 
 
Figure 4. U.S. Department of Homeland Security.62 
However, in 2005, the disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina taught the United 
States that homeland security was threatened not only by man-made crises. Hence in 
October 2007, a “homeland security strategy” was announced, which emphasizes “natural 
disasters” as a threat to the homeland security environment.63 After Hurricane Katrina, 
besides the original counterterrorism and other security framework, the homeland 
security was also focused on emergency and disaster management, which means that it 
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has gradually moved towards integration of government forces and civil parties as 
Homeland Security entities. In other words, the nature of homeland security has 
expanded.64 Comparing the Homeland Security National Strategy of 2002 and 2007, we 
can see the change in strategies. See Table 3. 
 




1. Intelligence and warning 
2. Border and transportation security 
3. Domestic counterterrorism 
4. Protecting critical infrastructures and  
    key assets 
5. Defending against catastrophic  
    threats 
6. Emergency preparedness and  
    response 
1. Prevent terrorist attack in the U.S.  
    territory  
2. Reduce U.S. vulnerability in terms of  
    terrorism 
3. When under attack, reduce losses to a 
    minimum and to recover from the  




1. Preventing terrorism and enhancing   
    security 
2. Securing and managing borders 
3. Enforcing and administering our  
    immigration laws 
4. Safeguarding and securing  
    cyberspace  
5.Ensuring resilience to disasters 
1. Prevent and break down terrorist  
    attacks and actions 
2. Protect the American people, critical  
    infrastructure and key resources 
3. Respond and recover from  
    unexpected incidents 
Table 3.   Comparison of 2002 and 2007 Homeland Security National Strategy.65 
The Department of Homeland Security was established and their goal is to 
address a variety of homeland security-related issues, to ensure border and aviation 
security, and to strengthen the U.S. ability to combat terrorism. 
3. National Security Council  
The National Security Council (NSC) is based on National Security Directive-1 
(NSPD-1) which set its structure. Its function is to act as the president’s advisory board 
on national security policy. The president himself serves as the NSC chairman, and holds 
decision-making power, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as military 
adviser, and the head of the CIA, who is responsible for the integration of 16 intelligence 
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agencies, advises on national security matters. The Director of Homeland Security, and 
the president’s personal advisor and economic advisor are also invited to participate on 
the National Security Council as well. The Director of the Department of Justice and the 
Director of Office of Management and Budget provide timely advice. Other government 
agencies also attend the National Security Council as required by the president.66 The 
Council can be distinguished by three levels based on their function: level one is the NSC 
Principals Committee (NSC/PC), chaired by the president, oversee foreign affairs, 
national defense, and critical national security-related information. Level two is the NSC 
Deputies Committee (NSC/DC), chaired by the National Security Adviser; it is primarily 
responsible for reviewing, coordinating, and supervising the implementation of national 
security policy. Level three is the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs), 
managed by the Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs; it is responsible for 
reviewing and monitoring National Security Council inter-agency coordination and 
provides suggestions and strategies on crisis management.  
According to U.S. national security law, the function of the National Security 
Council is “to give advice to the president on national security matters related to domestic, 
foreign affairs and the integration of military policy in order to strengthen the military 
departments and other relevant government ministries to collaborate more efficiently 
when involves in national security affairs. At the National Security Council’s operational 
level, the core members of the Cabinet must hold Executive Committee and Secretary 
Committee meetings before the president holds a formal National Security Council 
meeting. The assistant secretaries will discuss the current crisis situation and any crisis, 
analyze the pros and cons of response strategies in advance, and then provide secretaries 
the different options.67 
The main task of the U.S. National Security Council is to coordinate and integrate 
national security affairs on the inter-departmental level. Due to various departments’ 
structure organization, and different cultural backgrounds and responsibilities, 
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government departments vary in how they achieve their goals and priorities. The National 
Security Council, as an internal coordination and integration platform, tries to reduce 
these discrepancies and lack of coordination. The methods that NSA uses include 
persuasion, negotiation, and force to increase the motivation to coordinate and integrate. 
Another way to reduce discrepancies between departments is to increase incentives so 
that the departments will understand the benefit of coordination and integration.68  
In sum, the reform of the National Security Council has the following 
characteristics: First, as the United States executive departments become increasingly 
specialized, the National Security Council can effectively integrate the opinions of the 
various departments, provide a communication platform to promote mutual consensus, 
and make it easier to achieve national security objectives. 
Second, the president has the flexibility to adjust the organization and structure of 
the National Security Council. He does not need to convene the entire National Security 
Council in special circumstances, but may make decisions with only a few cabinet 
members. Although such a power can accelerate decision-making process, based on past 
experience, it might lead to adverse consequences due to improper presidential decision-
making. 
Third, under the National Security Council, there are the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The 
National Security Council coordinates, integrates and manages the intelligence systems 
and activities. The DCI, as the National Security Council intelligence advisor, plays an 
important role in the implementation of national security policy. 
 RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES  C.
1. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 
Within the U.S. intelligence community fights over budgets and the president’s 
attention have been a concern. The lack of intelligence-sharing and coordination 
problems have existed for a long time as well. Among all the agencies, the most powerful 
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one, the Department of Defense, which owns a huge organization for collecting 
intelligence and advanced high-tech equipment, does not cooperate with the CIA.69 
Before 2004, the leaders of the U.S. intelligence system were the DCI, and the director of 
the CIA had authority over the DCI. When the intelligence system made serious mistakes 
on 9/11 events and the banned weapons investigation in Iraq, it resulted in great losses to 
U.S. national interests. Moreover, national security agencies, including the FBI, U.S. 
Customs and the air traffic control centers, and other units also showed insufficient 
capability of gathering intelligence, poor judgment, and a lack of decisiveness during 
these situations. These failed mechanisms revealed security weaknesses and a need for 
remediation and effective integration of intelligence. Therefore, in 2004, Congress passed 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and established The 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who heads an independent administrative agency, 
directly under the president’s command and control. The DNI coordinates and guides the 
U.S. national intelligence program, administers 16 U.S. intelligence organization systems, 
and is the key advisor to the U.S. President, the U.S. National Security Council, and the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security.70 Usually DNI is responsible for collection and 
prioritizing of intelligence information after making the intelligence gathering points list 
(now known as “national intelligence gathering point framework). After the National 
Security Council reviews it, the president will approve it every half of the year, then 
hands the list over to the CIA or other different components of the intelligence division to 
divide the collected intelligence. The DNI also supervises the Joint Intelligence 
Community Council Report.71  Under this mechanism, the core of the U.S. national 
security agencies (the National Security Council, the State Department, the Department 
of Defense, and CIA) intelligence sharing system has been built into the structure of the 
National Security Council. Meanwhile, the National Counterterrorism Center was built to 
coordinate all intelligence missions against terrorist activity. These represent the most 
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significant changes to the intelligence organizations of the United States since the 
establishment of the CIA at the end of World War II. The 9/11 incident accelerated this 
reform. 
2. FBI Task and Organizational Adjustments 
FBI task and organizational adjustments can be divided into four areas, namely 
reforming the capability of the FBI, reshaping the FBI’s two-stage adjustment, and 
solving the structural defects associated with the FBI. The restructuring not only 
improved coordination and integration of the Defense Department and the CIA at the 
intelligence operations level, but also strengthened the intelligence policy guidance 
functions of the National Security Council. Under this mechanism, the intelligence-
sharing between the United States’ core national security agencies (the National Security 
Council, Department of State, Department of Defense, CIA) has been built into the 
structure of the National Security Council system automatically. 
3. Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) 
The 9/11 incident let the Bush administration understand the intelligence units’ 
lack of effective integration. In order to solve this problem, President Bush, in his 2003 
State of the Union address, required the leaders of the CIA, FBI, the Justice Department, 
Homeland Security, and the Secretary of Defense to work together and establish the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) to integrate and analyze all the domestic and 
foreign intelligence that relates to terrorism. The TTIC can further shape the most 
complete picture of possible terrorist threats. The center became operational on May 1,  
 
2003, and it plays a supervisory role in national counterterrorism. It also maintains 
systems related to updating the terrorism database so that government officials at all 
levels can extract information when needed.72 
                                                 
72 Yuwei Wang, The National Intelligence Research Under New Security Threat (Taipei: Prospect 
Quarterly, 2003), 128. 
 48
4. Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) 
The TSC was established on September 16, 2003, as a centralized intelligence 
integration center. The way it functions is the intelligence units submit all data related to 
terrorists, domestic or international, at the TSDB, and then share that information with 
the FBI, the relevant countries, Department of Homeland Security, National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC), and the Department of State, etc. The main purpose of the 
TSC is to ensure the investigators, screening officers, and detectives can work together 
under a unified counterterrorism information mechanism and make them able to monitor 
or prevent suspects effectively.73 
Overall, the U.S. is actively reforming its intelligence integration mechanisms and 
intelligence gathering operations and processes, and re-establishing the intelligence 
system to exercise organizational changes. After the 9/11 incident, the national defense 
system, crisis management mechanism, or the intelligence system experienced substantial 
improvements and their functions were also enhanced considerably. However, there are 
still potential problems with information sharing. The U.S. government has no specific 
organization or computer database systems that can fully integrate intelligence, law 
enforcement, immigration control, public health, and homeland security-related 
information. That is mainly due to inconsistencies and incompatibility in the computer 
systems among government departments. Therefore, the absence of mechanisms for 
coordination and cooperation leads to incomplete and inaccurate knowledge of terrorist 
organizations and their activities. Besides the problem with computer information 
systems at the federal level, state and local governments use their own communication 
systems that are outdated, which makes communication difficult and ineffective.74   
 CHAPTER CONCLUSION D.
It has been 12 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The United States was 
shocked by its insufficient response when the terrorist attack happened on its own soil, 
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and thus the United States was prompted to review its counterterrorism legislation, 
command mechanism, and the loopholes between government agencies and intelligence 
units. Although Bin Laden was killed in 2011 in a U.S. Special Forces raid, the terrorist 
threat has not yet terminated. For example, this April, the Boston Marathon bombings 
killed three and 183 others were injured in this tragedy. This August, the United States 
received intelligence sources indicating that a California-born Islamic jihadist, Adam 
Gadahn, called on Al-Qaeda to attack the United States embassies in the Middle East, 
North Africa, and elsewhere using a variety of means and weapons to attack the United 
States Embassy officials, public transport systems, and tourist facilities.75 In addition, the 
terrorist attacks still continue. The threat of terrorist attacks has not yet disappeared. 
Since the 9/11 incident, the U.S. made a massive adjustment on political, military, 
intelligence and counterterrorism policies, such as getting the support of the United 
Nations, building an international coalition against terrorism, initiating military action 
against terrorist organizations, and preventing proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.76  
The “Ministry of National Security” was established in order to consolidate eight 
federal “ministries” and 22 federal government agencies, but the CIA and FBI were not 
included. Therefore, the establishment of National Security Council was only to 
strengthen the transmission and analysis of intelligence domestically and 
internationally.77 But no matter what, the establishment of the “Ministry of National 
Security” has its flexibility on organization, resources, authority, and personnel 
appointments. The various measures mentioned in this chapter may not yet show 
significant results in such a short period of time, but on the whole, the United States not 
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only takes practical action to fight against terrorists, but also declares its determination on 
counterterrorism to the whole world. 
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IV. STUDY OF JAPANESE COUNTERTERRORISM 
MECHANISMS 
Japan is a country located in the Pacific Rim, which is subject to many 
earthquakes and typhoons. Because rainfall and rivers are short and fast, floods are also 
frequent. Therefore, Japan has a strong sense of crisis prevention. Traditionally, the crisis 
management core is based on natural disasters. However, since the 1990s, a series of 
terrorist attacks have occurred in Japan and the United have made the Japanese aware of 
the insufficiency of their domestic counterterrorism laws and crisis management 
capability. The first event that heightened their awareness was the Matsumoto incident, 
which occurred at the end of June 1994, perpetrated by seven members of Aum Shinrikyo 
in Nagano Prefecture residential areas. Seven people were killed and 660 others were 
harmed by Sarin gas in the tragedy. This chemical weapons terrorist attack brought 
Japan’s terrorist threat and counterterrorism measures to a new level. The second incident 
was the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. The incident occurred in 1995 and was 
again the work of Aum Shinrikyo. The attacked locations were at Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda 
district, Tokyo, where the cabinet ministry offices are, and the metro station Nagata-cho 
close to the Parliament. A total of 12 people were killed, and more than 5,500 people 
were injured in the tragedy.78 After this attack, the government established laws focusing 
on the manufacture of sarin chemicals, and on possessing and spreading deadly chemicals. 
The third incident was the Japanese embassy hostage crisis. The incident took place in 
the end of 1996; Peru leftist guerrillas captured the Japanese embassy. Although the 
Peruvian police raided and safely rescued all the hostages, the Japanese government still 
decided to further improve the ability of its counterterrorism forces, and in the following 
year, more than twenty billion yen were provided to establish training bases and related 
facilities.79 The fourth incident was the 9/11 attack in the United States. After that attack, 
the Japanese government believed that Japan would become the next target of terrorists, 
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and there are three reasons for this assumption. First, Japan is an ally of the United States. 
Japan has formulated a Counterterrorism Countermeasures Act and the Top-Down Policy 
Process to Dispatch the SDF (Self-Defense Forces) to Iraq to support the U.S. war on 
terror. Second, there are many U.S. facilities in Japan. These facilities are likely to 
become targets of terrorist organizations. Third, Japan has been actively assisting 
countries in Southeast Asia with their ability to enhance counterterrorism, and would be 
regarded as a challenge to international terrorist organizations.80 The statements issued 
by terrorist organizations have repeatedly listed the Japanese as a target. The statements 
published by Bin Laden in October 2002 indicated that the U.S. and its allies will be the 
objects of attack. When Japan decided to dispatch Self-Defense Forces to Iraq after 
October 18, 2003, Bin Laden said that he owned the right to retaliate in the appropriate 
place and time. Japan is listed as the target of attack a total of 10 times, along with 
England nine times and Spain.81 The Madrid train station and the London Underground 
were subsequently attacked. On the day of the attack in Madrid, terrorist organizations 
issued a statement that Japan would probably be the next target.82 As a result, Japan 
considered it necessary to strengthen its defenses to cope with terrorist attacks; therefore, 
Japan had the opportunity to strengthen its security mechanisms. 
After reviewing its related mechanisms, the Japanese government discovered that 
some of the emergency response measures needed a legal basis, and the command 
structure also lacked efficiency. As a result, the counterterrorism mechanism legalizations 
became the urgent need.83  The following section provides an overview of how the 
government reformed its counterterrorism mechanisms through regulations and cabinet 
systems. 
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 REGULATIONS AND REFORM A.
In the mid-1990s, Japan experienced a series of major natural disasters and 
terrorist attacks, which changed the emphasis from the national crisis management 
mechanism accommodating a variety of large-scale disasters to the national response 
mechanism for emergencies. The first incident was the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, 
resulting in the loss of nearly 10 trillion yen. The crisis management system at the time 
was focusing on the security of the Cabinet; therefore, there was a lack of unified central 
command and crisis management decision-making, which caused the ministries to be 
unresponsive when the earthquake happened, and resulted in the failure of the overall 
crisis management capabilities. The government’s indecisiveness in the emergency was 
strongly questioned and criticized by the news media and the people. Another factor was 
the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks in Japan between 1993 and 1995. After reviewing 
the sarin attacks, Japan discovered that the laws had no restriction on manufacturing, 
possessing, and distributing deadly chemical materials. In conclusion, the several 
incidents that occurred in 1990s provided an excellent opportunity for Japan to 
restructure its crisis management system and to amend laws. The counterterrorism 
mechanism is a part of crisis management prevention. There are five methods to improve 
the counterterrorism mechanism: 1) legislation or amendments; 2) strengthening the 
prime minister’s powers in crisis management to ensure the authority of the central 
command system and functionality; 3) simplification of the central ministries and 
organizations; 4) reduction of administrative functions and increasing efficiency; and  
5) the reform of the civil service system. These methods can enhance the government’s 
response to crisis and any counterterrorism contingency.84  
1. Sarin Gas Attack 
The first piece of legislation came in response to the Tokyo sarin incident. The 
Japanese Parliament passed a law for “the Prevention of Harm of People from Sarin” in 
April 1995, to prohibit the manufacture and possession of sarin and related items, and set 
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penalties for spreading it. The enactment of this law against sarin closed Japan’s legal 
loopholes in this area. In addition, in order to enhance the capability of dealing with the 
crisis, in April 1998, the Cabinet Crisis Management and the Cabinet Security of Crisis 
Management Offices were established among the Cabinet Secretariat (now changed to 
Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary). The office simulates the situation after the 
terrorist attacks of chemical weapons and its corresponding reaction measures. The office 
has proposed to address the “toxic event handling drills report” and “deal with nuclear, 
biological and other weapons of mass destruction threat of terrorist attacks” in a standard 
operating procedures manual. Secondly, in April 2000, the National Police Agency Guard 
Bureau established the new “major terrorist attack countermeasures office” responsible 
for handling “international relations that have a major impact, obviously endanger 
national vital interests, or significantly damage most people’s lives, body or property.”85  
2. Great Hanshin Earthquake 
In order to improve the imperfect government crisis management system’s 
handling of the Great Hanshin Earthquake for future emergencies, the Japanese 
government conducted a comprehensive revision in July 1995 under the “Disaster Basic 
Countermeasures” in Article 34, “Disaster basic plan’s formulation,” paragraph 1, in 
accordance with the regulatory procedure “Disaster Basic Plan.” This law originated in 
1961, when the central to local government disaster prevention system was established. 
However, the Central Disaster Prevention Council was ineffective. In 2002, the national 
sectorial disaster plan, the Disaster Prevention Plan, and local government disaster plan, 
“Regional Disaster Plan, were finally completed. In addition to the revision and 
improvement of the disaster plans, the Japanese laws pertaining to disaster prevention 
have also been improved. Japan’s basic disaster-related law, Disaster Basic 
Countermeasures, has been substantially modified, forming a Cabinet Office as the core, 
and an in-depth disaster prevention countermeasures planning system from the central to 
local government level, which changes the bureaucratic system. The emphasis of this  
 
                                                 
85 Naofumi Miyasaka, Japan’s Anti-Terrorism (Tokyo: Eslite, 2004), 121‒122, quoted in Lin, 
International Terrorism and Countermeasures: From Japan’s Perspective, October 30, 2007, 11‒12. 
 55
bottom-up approach not only helps various departments’ coordination, but also affects the 
operation of the government response mechanisms and performance when a crisis 
happens.  
In regards to command responsibilities, the New Disaster Basic Countermeasures 
increase the Prime Minister’s power in crisis management, which enables the Prime 
Minister to play an important role in a vertical centralization advantage. Before amending 
the law, the Japanese central government’s administrative affairs were distributed to 
different ministries. The Prime Minister had no power to direct the administrative affairs 
between ministries. Due to the lack of power of the Prime Minister, problems occurred 
when it came to responsibilities. The lack of coordination among these ministries led to 
inefficient connections. Under the amended law, the Prime Minister, who is responsible 
for leading the Cabinet Security Council, can issue direct orders to those responsible for 
crisis management and administrative authorities of the police, fire, and defense during 
major crises. In addition, in the event of large-scale disasters or riots, the Prime Minister 
has the power to issue temporary emergency status and could command and control 
police units.86 
3. Reform of Administrative System 
Other legislation was enacted with the October 1996 election, based on ex-Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s six core elements of political reform. Hashimoto believed 
that a “centralized nation” type of vertical administration, which has a central 
government led by a bureaucracy and controlling the budget, was not an efficient 
government. Therefore, he decided to reform the government. First, on June 12, 1998, the 
Reform of the Central Ministries and Agencies Basic Law, was passed, while the related 
laws were amended with specific measures. This reform started officially on January 6, 
2001, and was also called Hashimoto  reform.87 Then in 1998, Article 4 of the revised 
Cabinet Law granted the prime minister the right to propose his/her own opinion when it 
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comes to a major policy or other major motions. That same year, the Cabinet Crisis 
Management Office was set up, with the same power as the Office of Vice Minister; It is 
coordinated and appointed by the Prime Minister and possesses the authority to 
coordinate various departments. In 1999, Article 15, paragraph 2 amendment, the Cabinet 
Security Office was expanded to the Cabinet Security and Crisis Management Office, to 
assist handling the Cabinet-related affairs other than the National Defense. These two 
amendments not only strengthened the Prime Minister’s powers, enabled centralized 
management during a crisis, and ensured the administrative structures functioning, but 
also established more complete administrative agencies to assist the Prime Minister. The 
new administrative and government agencies started operation in January 2001. 
4. Counterterrorism Legislation after 9/11 
After the 9/11 incident on U.S. soil in 2001, Japan enacted several large-scale 
regulatory amendments. The laws amended were related to counterterrorism and caused 
controversy among the international community; the first such law is the 
Counterterrorism Special Measures Law which was passed on October 29, 2002, and 
authorized the Japan Self-Defense Forces to support not only the U.S. military in supply, 
transportation, medical, and telecommunication, but also in non-combat areas, including 
Japan’s territorial waters, the high seas, and foreign territories on which other nations 
agree. The second amendment was the Coast Guard Act Amendment which authorizes 
firing on a suspect vessel that poses a threat in Japanese territorial waters. And the third 
amendment, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces Amendment, allows the government to 
authorize the use of force when necessary and to be on guard when the Self-Defense 
Forces and U.S. military stationed in Japan face terrorist threats. Yet, except for the 
second and the third amendments that are directly related to the prevention of terrorist 
activities, the first amendment allowed the Self-Defense Forces to dispatch their troops to 
the Indian Ocean and Iraq legally, providing logistical support for the U.S. military. Back 
in 2001 when the United States attacked Afghanistan, the Japanese government as an ally 
of the U.S., in order to prevent the terrorist attacks on the their territory, held an inter-
provincial meeting on October 16 to discuss various counterterrorism mechanisms, and 
proposed six focus points on promoting counterterrorism matters. These focal points have 
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become the blueprint for future development of counterterrorism measures, including the 
entry and exit territory and intelligence exchange, terrorists and funding surveillance, 
vital facilities security maintenance, nuclear, biological, and network security, prevention 
of hijacking and overseas Japanese information support.88 After the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
in 2004, the Japanese have received warnings of terrorist attack. In response to the 
warnings, the Japanese National Police Agency in August 2004 proposed a 
Counterterrorism Measures Promotion Outline to enhance its preventive measures and 
emergency response capabilities. In December, the agency also announced a plan of 
action to “prevent terrorist attacks in the first place” which included a total of 16 
measures.89 The Japanese economic interest is globally distributed, and any large-scale 
terrorist attacks are likely to harm their interests. Therefore, protecting its foreign 
interests has become an important goal of the Japanese counterterrorism measures. 
Furthermore, the Self-Defense Forces amendment passed on 6 June 2003, 
responding to Armed Attack Situations Security Act and the amendment to the Security 
Conference, gives the Prime Minister special rights to bypass the Security Conference 
and Cabinet when facing emergency situations, to call for the Self-Defense Forces and to 
use local and private resources.90 In the same year on September 18, several cases of 
anthrax incidents occurred in the United State, five people were killed and 17 people 
were infected. And it also caused panic in international society. Although the Japanese 
have experience in dealing with sarin, they still deal with it cautiously. The Prime 
Minister in November the 8th called for a Cabinet meeting to develop measures against 
terrorist chemical weapons attacks. In critical situations, the Prime Minister has the right 
to activate the emergency disaster response system which is beyond the past step by step 
rigid administrative system. The Cabinet agencies can be more flexible and accelerate 
administrative efficiency when crisis occurs.91 
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 OPERATIONS OF THE COUNTERTERRORISM DECISION-MAKING B.
MECHANISM  
1. Prime Minister’s Command Responsibilities 
Japan operates with the parliamentary cabinet system which has legislative, 
judicial, and executive power. According to the Japanese Constitution, the Cabinet is the 
highest administrative institution, and is in charge by authority of the Parliament. The 
head of the government of Japan is formally known as the Prime Minister, which is 
Japan’s highest leader. On the October 20, 1996, at the House of Representatives election 
campaign, political parties have put forward the policy of administrative reform. An 
Administrative Reform Conference was held in that period of time and its first meeting 
was held in the same month. Within a year after the conference, following the 
instructions of the Prime Minister Hashimoto, recommendations were proposed. A total 
of 42 meetings were held until December 3, 1997, and then a closing report was 
presented. This report described the purpose of administrative reform—”radical reform of 
large, complex, and rigid, institutions and the preservation of a free and just society is a 
must. In order to achieve this, we must construct and implement proper and effective 
national systems, as well as achieve simplicity, efficiency, and transparency in 
government administrations.”92 There are four recommended measures: 1) the Cabinet 
feature enhancement, 2) the reform of the central ministries and agencies, 3) the 
increased efficiency of administrative functions, and 4) civil service reform.93 This bill 
was formally launched on January 6, 2001 and it strengthened disaster management 
administrative functions by reforming the Cabinet Secretariat’s overall structure. As for 
streamlining of the central government organizations, it was adjusted from 22 
departments to 12, which is the smallest number of government organizations among 
developing countries. Other than that, policy and enforcement authorities were separated 
in order to streamline government organizations, to release central government powers, 
and to strengthen decentralization of local government. In addition to the purpose of 
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central administrative reform, ministries organizational adjustments, and administrative 
function reduction and efficiency, the most important reform was to strengthen the 
coordination of the Cabinet decision and crisis management capabilities. The Prime 
Minister’s Office was renamed after the reform as the Cabinet Office; the Cabinet is still 
dominated by the Cabinet Secretariat, and is responsible for coordination mechanisms 
between departments, with a particular emphasis on strengthening the Prime Minister’s 
political dominance. Before amending the law, there were no clear regulations regarding 
the Prime Minister’s proposal rights. According to the old law under Article 4 of the 
Cabinet, the Prime Minister’s powers must be exercised “based on the principle of the 
Cabinet meeting,” and the Prime Minister’s exercise of authority must be based on 
resolutions of the Cabinet meeting and followed the “prior censorship” of past practice. 
The Prime Minister’s proposal must be restricted to the ruling political party’s forces, 
which limits the Cabinet’s function to only admitting the decisions that are already made 
between parties afterwards. Before amending the law, the Cabinet meeting’s function was 
merely a “rubber stamp.” The Prime Minister’s right of proposal was still subject to 
substantial restrictions.94 However, the new system clearly gives the Prime Minister the 
right to make proposals which authorize him space on national policy decision making. 
This command mechanism is very helpful for the implementation of counterterrorism, 
because the Prime Minister is the direct leader of the Cabinet Security Meeting, and 
under the security meeting is the counter-terrorism headquarters which handles the crisis 
management team when a terrorist attack happens. This Cabinet administrative reform 
that clarifies the Prime Minister’s right of proposal makes it possible to avoid “prior 
censorship” constraints and to take the initiative in policy making.   
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2. Cabinet Decision-Making Mechanism 
 Structure of Organization a.
The Cabinet Office is the main authority to handle crisis management, and 
the Prime Minister is the center of that office. The Cabinet Secretariat is the main unit 
that directly supports the Prime Minister. The nature of it is the same as that of Executive 
Yuan of Taiwan. He or she is the Chief Cabinet Secretary responsible for coordinating all 
matters and implementing the Prime Minister’s right of proposal. The amended law was 
also to review the Cabinet system, since it is the institution that supports the Prime 
Minister. Before amending the law, although the Cabinet Secretariat was the head of the 
system, the number of people was no more than 30. However, a limited number of 
Cabinet personnel were responsible for Cabinet Office on Domestic Affairs, Cabinet 
Office on Foreign Affairs, Cabinet Secretariat Security Protection and Crisis 
Management Office, and the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office. When it comes to 
dealing with important policy, the Cabinet Decision-Making Mechanism only relies on 
the Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Prime 
Minister, and five officers. Therefore, Japan’s government must still rely on the 
assistance of the bureaucracy, and hence, the Cabinet Secretariat loses its dominance.95 
Therefore, under the new system, the number of Cabinet Secretariat personnel will be 
expanded, more talented civilians will be recruited, and the Prime Minister is provided 
full assistance. The Cabinet of Japan now consists of three Deputies of the Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, of which one is responsible for security and a variety of crisis management 
activities, including security conference-related services, security systems, and policy 
research, large-scale natural disasters, major accidents response, and civilian protection 
(Cabinet Secretariat security).96 The Director of Cabinet Crisis Management is in charge 
of crisis management among government affairs. The agency is responsible for the 
coordination of and acts as liaison between the administrative units. In addition, after the 
administrative reform, according to the Cabinet Law Article 12, paragraph 2 “Cabinet  
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affairs,” the agency was also given the power to “plan and draft” which enables it to take 
the initiative in planning and drafting new policy.97 See Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Cabinet Secretariat Security Protection, Crisis Management.98 
Furthermore, due to the experience of the Great Hanshin Earthquake, the Cabinet 
Office is in succession to establish many of the institutions that will assist the Cabinet in 
handling all kinds of crises. For example, in February 1995, the Urgent Convening Group 
was established by the Secretary of each office. In May 1996, the Cabinet Intelligence 
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Collection Center was open around the clock to gather intelligence automatically when an 
emergency situation occurred. In April 1998, the position of Director of the Cabinet 
Crisis Management was created. In April 2001, the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center 
was established. Some other institutions were also founded at the same time, such as the 
Special Committee in Response to Emergency, International Organization of Crime and 
International Terrorism Countermeasures Promotion Headquarters, and Cabinet 
Intelligence and Security Center. In times of crisis, the head of decision-making 
ministries, such as the Security Council and the Central Disaster Prevention Council, 
develop emergency crisis response protocols, which are implemented by the Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Meteorological Agency, the Ministry of Defense, 
and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency. In addition, the Cabinet Secretariat in the 
crisis management regime has another function, which is to obtain information as soon as 
possible, to convey it to the relevant departments, and to implement the necessary 
measures to eliminate public fear and anxiety. In short, the Cabinet Secretariat is 
responsible for crisis management in the event of a major crisis situation, and the Cabinet 
can make the first judgment and quickly take the necessary measures. 
 Emergency Response Procedures b.
Japan’s crisis management unit can be distinguished in three levels. The 
first level is the Cabinet Office, which is responsible for policy planning, the second level 
is the Cabinet Secretariat, which is responsible for directing the implementation of crisis 
management response units, and the third level is various government agencies, which 
are responsible for executing the tasks. The characteristics of Japan’s crisis management 
units are a quick response mechanism, a clear division of tasks, fast implementation of 
actions, reasonable setup of the departments, and clear job distribution. When a major 
accident or incident occurs, the Cabinet Intelligence Collecting Center immediately 
collects and confirms intelligence, and reports to the Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, Deputy Chief, and Director of Crisis Management. After the Director of Crisis 
Management receives notification, related personnel then immediately enter the Crisis 
Management Center (located in the basement of the presidential residence) to convene 
the a meeting with relevant ministries and agencies. If it is determined that there is an 
 63
armed attack, then the special committee and security committee will be convened to deal 
with the situation. After that, depending on the scope and extent of damage, “the relevant 
ministries and agencies, Cabinet members’ meeting, Security Council, interim Cabinet 
meeting” or the “Government Response Headquarters” might be set up to address 
different situations.99 See Figure 6.   
 
 
Figure 6. Japan’s Crisis Management Mechanisms Procedure.100 
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100 Ibid,. 
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 RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  C.
1. Current Status of Intelligence Agencies Implementation 
Japan’s existing intelligence organizations are the Cabinet Intelligence and 
Investigation Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, 
Pubic Security Intelligence Agency, and National Police Agency. The Cabinet 
Intelligence and Investigation Office is Japan’s top intelligence agency and is placed 
under the Cabinet Secretariat, and the Cabinet Intelligence Officers are responsible for 
coordination activities. The office’s former name was the Cabinet Prime Minister 
Investigation Office. It was formally established on August 30, 1952, directly under the 
leadership of Chief Cabinet Secretary. After repeated restructuring in 1968, it was 
officially named the Cabinet Intelligence and Investigation Office. Its main task is to 
collect and integrate domestic and international political, economic, cultural and security 
intelligence. For example, the Defense Agency Intelligence System, the police 
intelligence system, and the Foreign Ministry intelligence systems collect intelligence 
and send the information to the Cabinet Intelligence and Investigation Office. After 
organizing and analyzing the gathered intelligence, office staff creates a report to present 
to the Cabinet Secretary. The Cabinet Chief provides intelligence to the Prime Minister 
weekly. But when there is a significant intelligence, the Cabinet intelligence officer can 
always directly report to the Prime Minister. On the whole, its function is similar to the 
CIA; however, compared to the nearly 18,000 employees in CIA, the Cabinet Intelligence 
and Investigation Office has only 170 to 175 employees. Among those staff, 100 are 
borrowed from other agencies and ministries. The members are mainly from the Japanese 
National Police Agency.101 The center is intended to coordinate and gather intelligence 
from different intelligence agencies, but the lack of manpower in the Cabinet Intelligence 
and Investigation Office hinders it from providing intelligence to the Prime Minister. 
Under the Cabinet Intelligence and Investigation Office, there are six units: the 
General Affairs Department, Domestic Agency, International Agency, Ministry of 
Economy, the Cabinet Center for Collective Intelligence, and the Cabinet Satellite 
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Intelligence Center. The Cabinet Center for Collective Intelligence and the Cabinet 
Satellite Intelligence Center are responsible for collecting and analyzing information 
related to the Cabinet Policy. In addition, there are non-governmental organizations and 
groups, such as foreign organizations, the media, civil society, firms, and research 
institutions. 102  The reason why the Cabinet Intelligence Collective Center was 
established was that in the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, information between various 
departments could not be shared. Therefore, the government decided to set up the center 
under the Cabinet Intelligence and Investigation Office, hoping to integrate the various 
intelligence agencies. In addition to the five members of the Cabinet Intelligence and 
Investigation Center, there are four personnel from each of the following agencies: Police 
Department, Defense Department, Fire Department, Public Security Department, and 
Maritime Security Department. The total number of personnel who work in the center is 
25, and they work five shifts to rotate for 24 hours. The center consists of a general office, 
data office, journalism office, equipment office, and intelligence office. The intelligence 
office is the main force of the center. The establishment of the Cabinet Intelligence 
Collective Center greatly strengthened the Japanese government’s ability to respond to 
emergencies.103 The intelligence systems, such as the Japan Defense Agency Information 
System, Police Intelligence System, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Intelligence System, 
compile the information obtained for the Cabinet Intelligence and Investigation Office, 
and then the office integrates all the intelligence for the Cabinet as a basis for decision. 
See Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Emergencies Intelligence Report Process.104  
Another point worth mentioning is the private intelligence agency, which is an 
intelligence network, composed of non-state actors, such as foreign trade companies, the 
news media, newspapers, television networks, general trading companies, and even the 
world’s political and economic surveys. These private agencies focus mainly on Foreign 
Intelligence Related Affairs collection and analysis, with particular emphasis on the 
economic level. Due to the limited budget and manpower of the office, Japan takes an 
intelligence outsourcing approach which is unique. Many of these people are retired 
intelligence personnel, with a considerable degree of intelligence professionals. A 
positive aspect to this approach is that if there is some inaccurate intelligence, the 
government can put the blame on to these outside sources, and reduce the damage to its 
integrity. However, a negative aspect is that the non-governmental institutions do not 
have the power of the government agencies and hence encounter more restrictions. 
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Furthermore, it is more difficult for the government to govern these institutions or 
personnel and to prevent them from leaking important intelligence.105  
Finally, the Satellite Intelligence Center integrates the high technology. It is 
located at the crisis management center in the basement of the Prime Minister’s official 
residence. The center is equipped with advanced electronic communications, 
broadcasting and surveillance equipment, with satellite, mobile, and fixed 
communications equipment. Whether it is from the vertical linkages between the Cabinet 
and various departments, or the horizontal coordination and resource sharing between 
units, it has formed a dense network. In April 27 of this year, Satellite Intelligence Center 
released to the public that it has completed a global spy satellite network, composed of 
two optical satellites and two radar satellites, which can monitor anywhere on earth for an 
entire day. It is an increase of Japan’s intelligence-gathering capabilities.106 
2. Reform of Intelligence Institution 
During the Cold War, Japan’s main source of intelligence was from the United 
States. After the Cold War, as a result of the changing situation in the world such as the 
1998 North Korean test of the Taepodong 1 missile over Japanese airspace, the Tokyo 
subway sarin incident, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States, the 
Japanese government was determined to take on the responsibility of collecting 
intelligence. In addition to investing in reconnaissance satellites, the Japanese 
government established or reformed intelligence agencies. In September 2005, the 
International Department proposed the first Machimura Report, and planned and set up 
an intelligence agency under the department. In the following year, the Liberal 
Democratic Party, in the second Machimura Report, called for a thorough reform of the 
central intelligence mechanism to increase the Prime Minister’s authority over 
intelligence in three ways: 1) to establish the Intelligence Committee by the members of 
the Cabinet, 2) to enhance the status of the Cabinet intelligence officer, and 3) to 
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establish intelligence assessment staff to assist the Joint Intelligence Committee. Also in 
February 2008, the Cabinet Office also proposed four intelligence reforms. The first is to 
establish an equal relationship between the Office of the Prime Minister and intelligence 
agencies. The second reform is to enhance intelligence gathering capability, and the third 
is to enhance the intelligence sharing between various departments and to increase the 
Office of the Prime Minister’s control of the flow of information. Finally, the fourth 
proposal called for the overall reform of the security system. The purpose is to establish a 
Japanese Cabinet Central Intelligence mechanism that is similar to the one in the UK, but 
would still retain the Cabinet Intelligence and Investigation Office.107 During this period 
of time, the government, the military intelligence agencies, and civil intelligence 
organizations went through continuous reform and development, and gradually formed 
the necessary vertical and horizontal linkages and coordination. Currently, the Japanese 
government, the military, and civil intelligence organizations have their own individual 
intelligence system. These three intelligence systems connect with each other, rely on 
each other, and form a trinity of intelligence organizations. 
According to the Japanese scholar Ken Kotani, Japan’s intelligence agencies are 
smaller, but they face several potential problems. First, they lack a unified central 
intelligence coordinating agency. Besides the current intelligence investigation office, a 
Joint Intelligence Committee was established in 1986, which is likely to cause problems 
between agencies when sharing intelligence. Second, the Japanese National Police 
Agency is currently the most influential unit in the intelligence department, and the 
recently reformed intelligence Cabinet offers no benefit for the National Police Agency. 
They are very protective of their own administrative territories. Third, the intelligence 
agencies’ status is low and the Japanese do not trust the results of the intelligence 
analysis. Furthermore, they do not think that they need it to assist in decision-making. 
Fourth, Japan lacks an efficient intelligence security system. Government agencies and 
intelligence units assign different definitions for confidential, and there is no perfect 
security mechanism. Fifth, politicians or decision makers would rather reach a consensus  
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between the political parties, rather than believe the result of intelligence, which also 
causes resentment among people in the intelligence agencies. This also indirectly affects 
the decisions of politicians.108   
The latest intelligence reform was on June 7, 2013. The Japanese Cabinet meeting 
decided in favor of the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC). Meanwhile, 
according to Japanese media, the Cabinet Office will set up a new sector specifically for 
collecting personal information under the Cabinet Intelligence and Investigation Office, 
which will be a great improvement for the Japanese intelligence gathering capability. 
According to a June 15 Hong Kong Wenhui Network reprint of the International Herald 
Tribune, a Chinese National Defense University military expert, Li DaGuang, published 
an article mentioning that the Japanese National Security Council is expected to set up 
intelligence liaison officers in main ministries, and directly provide intelligence to the 
Prime Minister on a daily basis. This is a breakthrough for Japan’s past administrative 
system and decision-making mechanisms. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe hoped 
that the nine Cabinet members of the Security Council can be reformed to the National 
Security Council. He recommended the establishment of a fixed mechanism whereby the 
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, and Chief Cabinet can meet 
regularly to deal with diplomatic and security challenges, and to integrate opinions. His 
expectation is to unify leadership, to strengthen intelligence efficiency, and to improve 
the speed and efficiency of the decision-making mechanism. 109  Also, according to 
Japan’s Asahi Shimbun reports on August 30, 2013, due to the establishment of the 
National Security Council, the intelligence management system reform was also 
discussed. It is expected that the Cabinet Intelligence Investigation Office will be 
changed to Cabinet Intelligence Council, and through the cooperation of the departments, 
will improve the capabilities of intelligence collection, analysis, and response to 
emergencies. Japan is trying to create a National Security Council similar to the United 
States’ NSC. The Abe administration plans to pass a related bill in the Fall interim 
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parliament meeting and the Cabinet Intelligence Council is going to be formally 
established in January next year. The former Cabinet Intelligence Investigation Office is 
to assist the Cabinet Crisis Management agency, while providing assistance to the Deputy 
Chief Cabinet Secretary in order for him to assist the Prime Minister. After the setup of 
the National Security Bureau, the Cabinet Intelligence Office staff was increased from 
one to three people, who are responsible for domestic, foreign, and defense affairs, as 
well as collecting intelligence from the Japanese National Police Agency, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and other intelligence agencies, and reporting 
intelligence analysis to the Prime Minister. One of the three offices will be appointed as 
the head of the Cabinet Intelligence agency, equivalent to the head of the new National 
Security Council. With such a unified intelligence system, people cannot help but 
question the lack of oversight for the intelligence unit which may cause the dominance of 
the Cabinet Intelligence Agency.110 See Figure 8.  
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Figure 8. Current Setup at Prime Minister’s Office.111  
3. Intelligence Sharing Mechanism 
As previously mentioned, the Japanese intelligence units’ linkage horizontally and 
vertically is weak. In order to solve this problem, the Japanese government established a 
Joint Information Council in July 1998. In October of that year a Cabinet Intelligence 
Council was established to solve the problem of intelligence sharing. In March 2008, 
more units were included to strengthen the functions, coordination, and sharing 
intelligence system, to grasp the important developments in Japan and abroad. The Joint 
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Information Council was organized by the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, and met once 
every two weeks. Their purpose is to aim at strengthening cooperation and 
communication between intelligence personnel.112 See Table 4.  
 
Table 4.   Cabinet Intelligence Council and Joint Information Council.113 
In 2005, Japan passed the Basic Emergency Bill to ensure the government basic 
framework for emergencies. The bill also aims to expand the Prime Minister’s powers 
when handling emergencies. The Joint Intelligence Council (established by the 
government ministries) and Joint Intelligence Division (formed by the safety and accident 
rescue specialists) were increased to enhance the ability of the Prime Minister in rapid 
decision making. The bill empowers the Prime Minister to assign command immediately 
to related units without first convening an emergency cabinet meeting. The Joint 
Intelligence Council, composed of the Defense Agency and the Foreign Secretary, 
perform long-term analysis and assess the government’s intelligence gathering to 
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113“Cabinet Intelligence Council,” Wikipedia, last modified March 7, 2013, 
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 Cabinet Intelligence Council Joint Information Council 
Time Twice a year Every two weeks 
Department Cabinet Secretariat Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office 
Host Cabinet Secretariat Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries 
Attendenees 
Self-Defense Forces 
1. Defense Intelligence Headquarters 
2. Intelligence Security Command  
3. JGSDF Military Intelligence Command 
    Fleet Intelligence Command 
    Air Intelligence Wing 
4. Military Intelligence
National Police Agency 
1. Security Bureau  
2. Criminal Investigation Bureau 
3. Metropolitan Police Department 
4. Police Headquarters 
5. Police Station
Coast Guard Guard and Rescue Department 
Ministry of Justice Public Security Intelligence Agency 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Intelligence and Analysis Service 
 
1.Radiopress, Inc 
2. External Trade Organization 
3. Sogo shosha
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determine the government action and to authorize the relevant units’ intelligence 
gathering. The joint intelligence headquarters assist the main cabinet meeting, which 
specializes in analyzing and evaluating information gathered from various 
departments.114 However, according to Japan’s Cabinet Meeting’s resolution in 2013, it 
is likely to combine the Cabinet Intelligence Conference meetings and the Joint 
Information Council together into a joint intelligence system.   
 CHAPTER CONCLUSION D.
Since the Tokyo subway sarin gas incident, Hanshin earthquake, and 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, the Japanese authorities have begun to establish relevant counterterrorism 
mechanisms and legislation. This is in direct relation to domestic and foreign threats. The 
Japanese have thoroughly re-examined their role in the international fight against 
terrorism and have taken to abandoning older methods and accelerating the 
counterterrorism legislation and supporting emergency response work. However, some 
legislation, such as the Counterterrorism Special Measures Law and the SDF 
amendments that provide a legal basis for military action, has proven controversial. In 
terms of the government emergency response mechanism, administrative reform started 
in 1997, through a unified command mechanism and flexible response procedures. The 
top decision makers can quickly issue a directive order which should be implemented 
immediately to achieve the purpose of a rapid command system. Meanwhile the central 
ministries and agencies at all levels of reorganization can eliminate duplication of tasks 
and improve administrative efficiency. The 9/11 incident has allowed the U.S. 
government to discover the loopholes in its counterterrorism system. Japan, as an 
American ally against terrorism is also facing the same problem; government agencies 
with vertical and horizontal linkages face the challenges of intelligence sharing and 
resistant attitudes of policy makers. If all these factors can be considered thoroughly 
Japan will be able to establish a more efficient response system, and thus be better able to 
face future threats. 
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V. STUDY OF TAIWAN COUNTERTERRORISM MECHANISMS 
Located in East Asia, Taiwan has a special geographical location and shares many 
similarities to Japan. First, both are important hubs in international transportation and 
trade in the Western Pacific. Second, Taiwan is a U.S. counterterrorism ally although it is 
still not the main target of international terrorists. Even so, that does not mean Taiwan is 
completely excluded from the possibility of being attacked. According to intelligence 
obtained by Taiwan’s national security and intelligence units, international terrorist 
organizations have long listed Taiwan as an unfriendly country. Al-Qaeda named Taiwan 
as one of the targets for terrorist attacks to retaliate against the U.S. Therefore, the 
possibility of being attacked cannot be ruled out.115 Based on the special geographical 
location, terrorist organizations can directly execute terrorist attacks against Taiwan or 
use Taiwan as a hub or springboard for launching terrorist attacks on specific neighboring 
countries, which would cause serious casualties for Taiwan or neighboring countries. 
Taiwan’s geographical location not only provides excellent transport advantages, but it 
also appeals to international terrorist organizations as a great location from which to 
launch attacks. 
On April 12 of this year, two Taiwanese suspects placed homemade bombs on the 
high-speed rail trains and in two legislators’ offices. Luckily, these bombs were not 
detonated, and the two suspects immediately escaped to Guangdong, the mainland, after 
committing the crime. With the mainlanders’ official assistance, the two men were 
arrested on April 14 and deported to undergo investigation and prosecution. The main 
suspect is a lawyer. Due to his dissatisfaction with an entrepreneur’s way of treating 
employees, the suspects attempted to destroy public transportation and cause panic, 
thereby affecting stock market trading to make a profit.116 As it happens, on April 15, 
the U.S. bombing of the Boston Marathon took place. Two Russian-American brothers, 
dissatisfied with the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting against Muslims, 
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decided placed two bombs in the audience area in the marathon finish line. Three people 
were killed and 250 were injured in the tragedy.117 These two terrorist attacks raised 
domestic and foreign governments’ concerns about terrorists. The Boston bombing not 
only ignited painful memories of the 9/11 incidents, it also had a significant effect on 
Taiwan, a land not attacked by terrorists. In fact, back in 2004, Taiwan’s rice bomber 
incident had occurred, when the various government departments had different opinions 
whether or not this event was a terrorist attack. There was a high-speed rail bombing and 
the reason why the Executive Yuan did not initiate any response mechanism for it was 
because the Executive Yuan counterterrorism operations control office and Police 
Highways Department had different definitions of terrorist attacks.118 Therefore, this year, 
the Minister of the Interior released a publication on April 17, saying that Taiwan should 
strengthen its awareness and training to enhance and re-examine the counterterrorism 
response mechanism.119  
The existing counterterrorism mechanism is based on the “anti-terrorist actions of 
organizational structure and operational mechanism,” by the Executive Yuan in 2004, 
which is the two-track system of combining the administration and national security 
system. However, after Mr. Yin Jiu Ma assumes authority, the main focus will be placed 
on the NSC. Therefore, the Executive Yuan’s Office of Homeland Security will have no 
real function. It is not only too small of a body (11 people), with an insufficient budget 
(by the NT $30 million in 2010 reduced to 2013 to 5 million). Even the draft regulation 
of the counterterrorism mechanism has not yet been formally completed. 120  Boston 
bombing terrorist attacks once again prompted countries to consider their crisis and risk 
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management, to review emergency measures, and to revise regulations. For Taiwan, the 
high-speed rail bombing made the government review seriously whether or not the 
existing counterterrorism mechanism is appropriate. The following will analyze the 
implementation the law, as well as the current situation of counterterrorism and 
intelligence unit operating conditions. 
 REGULATORY FORMULATION AND REFORM A.
To respond to the U.N. Security Council 1373 resolution of September 28, 2001, 
the 4385 meeting, to prevent terrorist acts, Taiwan has also taken action to fight against 
terrorists. Taiwan has long seen Mainland China as the main threat and Taiwanese 
believe that it is less likely that Taiwan will be under terrorist attack. However, following 
the change of the international political environment, Taiwan is facing threats that are 
different from the past. So for counterterrorism operations and the maintenance of world 
peace, the government and people should be more cautious, actively cooperate with 
relevant anti-terrorist actions, the laws establishing anti-terrorism mechanisms should be 
completed, and clearly define terrorism as a major crime. Taiwan should strengthen and 
exchange information with international counterterrorism intelligence organizations to 
establish cooperative relations with other countries, in order to effectively control 
terrorism.121  
Legislation is the basis for the implementation of counterterrorism operations. 
Although the current administration has set up related laws or regulations, it has not 
identified a specific unit responsible for a counterterrorism program. The 
counterterrorism missions are enforced by a set of different institutions. Different chains 
of command may produce problems related to command responsibilities, resource 
consolidation, and intelligence sharing. So far the Legislative Yuan has not passed the 
Draft Anti-Terrorist Action Law. The following discussion is related to counterterrorism 
law enforcement. 
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1. Draft Anti-Terrorist Action Law, Executive Yuan Version 
After the 911 incident, the Taiwan Government took immediate response 
measures and started the National Security mechanism. President Chen Shui-bian 
convened the Sanzhi Conference on September 8, 2002, to discuss counterterrorism and 
democracy issues. There were ten conclusions from the conference, where the ninth and 
the tenth are counterterrorism-related, primarily in support of the U.S. counterterrorism 
operations, with Taiwan agreeing to take practical action to participate in the fight against 
terrorism. In addition, the conference also called for people to understand the terrorist 
threat to Taiwan and also indicated that Taiwan should strengthen the counterterrorism 
act, while the Draft Anti-Terrorist Action Law was derived from the Executive Yuan in 
response to terrorism.122 
The draft was divided into two versions. The first version was made in 2001 by 
the Executive Yuan, developed by the Ministry of Justice, and contained a total of 20 
Articles. It mainly covers how to redefine the term terrorist, to establish a 
counterterrorism authority unit, to integrate intelligence sources, to organize military 
equipment, to keep a communication record, to seize terrorist-related property, and to set 
international cooperation and agreements. From the viewpoint of the Ministry of Justice, 
the domestic law already has regulations related to terrorist actions. However, in order to 
enhance the legal system, unifying powers, and intelligence, as well as international 
cooperation, special legislation is needed.123 Furthermore, in response to acts of terrorism, 
the Executive Yuan set up the Counterterrorism Action Group in 2003.124  And, on 
November 20, 2002, the Draft Anti-Terrorist Action Law-Executive Yuan Version was 
submitted to the Executive Yuan. The Legislative Yuan reviewed and approved it on 
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November 12, 2003 and submitted it to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation.125 (As of 
this writing, the draft still has not been passed.) If this draft is passed, then the relevant 
law enforcement agencies can give power to help prevent terrorist action from taking 
place. However, the draft has not yet been released to the Legislative Yuan. 
There are some controversies in the Executive Yuan’s version. First, there are 
concerns regarding the violation of human rights related to Article 8, Identity Verification 
of Suspected Terrorists. The law enforcement agencies have the right to detain suspects 
for 24 hours to verify their identity which might violate the suspect’s human rights. 
Article 9, Suspected Terrorists Houses, allows law enforcement agencies to identify 
possible hazardous houses, which they can break into for inspection. This right may be 
abused by law enforcement officers. Articles 10 and 11 allow suspected accounts, real 
estate or property used to assist terrorists to be frozen.126 These Articles should avoid the 
excessive tendency to exceed their power, which leads to possible violations of human 
rights and democracy. Secondly, the authority is unclear. Although Article 3 says that the 
Executive Yuan Counterterrorism Operation Team is responsible for commanding, the 
adoption of two-track system of the NSC and the Executive Yuan leads to the lack of 
clarity in terms of commanding power. Even though the Executive Yuan has the 
commanding power, its staff numbers, budgets, are professional abilities are somewhat 
inadequate. All the related staff members are part-time, unlike in the United States in 
which all counterterrorism efforts are coordinated by only the Department of Homeland 
Security, and DHS has a huge budget and professional staff. Similar to the U.S., the 
Japanese Cabinet Secretary is the only unit responsible for all counterterrorism policy-
making, command, and coordination. Third, there is a lack of content specifications since 
only 20 Articles are related to counterterrorism. There are still many legal issues that are 
not explicitly covered, for example, relating to public transportation, nuclear energy, 
electricity or chemical factories, and foreigners’ regulations.  
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2. Draft Anti-Terrorist Action Law, Legislative Yuan Revised Version 
In view of the first version, which has many shortcomings, on September 27, 
2004, the Ministry of Justice proposed again the second edition of the draft amendment 
with a total of 41 Articles in four chapters. Unlike the first version, the second version 
focused on strengthening management by adopting active investigation of combat 
terrorism activists.127 The second version of the draft amendments resolved the first 
version’s problems. It referenced and integrated the contents of the legal provisions in 
many countries, particularly the U.S. Patriot Act which is the legal basis for Department 
of Homeland Security law enforcement. However, the U.S. Patriot Act was created in 
response to the 9/11 incident, and there are many disputes about the law in spite of 
fighting terrorists.  
The U.S. Patriot Act expanded federal law enforcement agencies’ powers in 
monitoring and electronic surveillance; increased the investigative agencies’ power to 
share intelligence information; and also reinforced the government’s control over money 
laundering and illegal immigrants. 128  Similarly, Japan invoked the concept of 
counterterrorism to rationalize and legalize the SDF’s participation in international 
counterterrorism activities. This made people doubt their motives. While Taiwan echoed 
the UN in combatting terrorism, issues such as the capability to respond to terrorist 
threats and overextending the power of law enforcement agencies have been widely 
discussed. Therefore, the draft still did not pass when the Executive Yuan submitted it 
again to the Legislative Yuan in March 21, 2007.  
There were still some concerns related to the human rights dispute, 
communications monitoring, terrorist property seizure, freezing of funds and other related 
issues. Up to this day, the draft has not passed.129 Although the Ministry of Justice had 
promised to rediscuss the third draft of the Anti-Terrorist Action Law three months after 
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the high-speed rail bombing in 2013, it still has not yet been completed. As a result, 
Taiwan still has no single unit responsible for the Draft Anti-Terrorist Action Law.130  
3. Current Regulations and Laws 
Although the Anti-Terrorist Action Law has not yet passed, Taiwan has other 
regulations to address possible terrorist attacks. According to Central Police University 
Associate Professor Ting Rong Cai, the Draft Anti-Terrorist Action Law focuses on three 
areas. The first is the structure for the organization, the second is authorization of power 
to law enforcement agencies, and the third is sanctions for the terrorists.131 While the 
intention of unifying power is to effectively integrate the resources of each unit, there are 
already many laws for the command system in the relevant government agencies and law 
enforcement to apprehend and punish terrorists. Below is a brief description of important 
laws and regulations. 
 Command Organization and Structure a.
Taiwan’s Constitution Article 2, 4, specifically explains the command 
organization and structure between the president, NSC, and NSB.132 The NSB, when 
coordinating intelligence, should convene the NSB Intelligence Coordinating Council, 
hosted by the head of the NSB and attended by the intelligence agencies. In addition, the 
Disaster Prevention and Relief Act also documents the details related to natural and man-
made disasters and the response to them. In the second chapter, concerning the disaster 
prevention organization, the functions and responsibilities of the central government, 
county, city, and town governments are described.  
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 Law Enforcement Authority and Punishment for Terrorists b.
The National Security Act, Article 3, the Communication Security and 
Surveillance Act, Articles 2 and 7, the manual of police investigation of crimes, Money 
Laundering Control Act, Special Services Regulations, the Draft of Important 
Infrastructure Facilities Security Regulations, Domestic Contingency Response 
Mechanisms, and the Guidelines of the Central Government Counterterrorism Response 
Center all address different responsibilities for handling counterterrorism.133  
At present, the existing legal basis for government counterterrorism 
organizations in Taiwan is very complete, but the terrorist threat is constantly evolving 
and the existing law may not be able to address the actions of terrorist organizations in 
the near future. The law must keep pace with terrorist tactics. Take the United States as 
an example. The 9/11 incidents made the U.S. government aware of the importance of 
aviation safety and stricter regulations. So on November 19, 2001, the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act was passed which gives law enforcement a basic reference to 
execute the law.134 However, Taiwan is now facing not only a threat to national defense, 
but also dramatic climate change which has triggered typhoons, floods, earthquakes, and 
other natural disasters in recent years. Along with the fear of terrorist strikes, Taiwan has 
to face other complex disasters in the future. The severity of these events is as great, or 
greater in some cases, than a war or terrorist attacks. This is why the United States 
established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is integrated with the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 22 other relevant agencies. The 
purpose of DHS is not limited to a single processing task, but is intended to strengthen 
disaster management, and to reduce the U.S. inter-agency task duplication, lack of 
integration, and administrative inefficiencies. Japan in recent years has also suffered from 
earthquakes, storms, snowstorms, floods, and even nuclear disaster, causing the 
government to use the national security system’s “all disaster countermeasures” as the 
national security policy planning basis, which includes comprehensive disaster threat 
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protection. 135  In view of this, Taiwan’s national security priorities should focus on 
national security, the establishment of an emergency response mechanism for complex 
disasters and terrorism attacks. Therefore, the government departments need to revise 
appropriate laws promptly and review foreign cases in order to learn from their 
experiences, and then set strict regulations for law enforcement agencies. 
 OPERATIONS OF THE DECISION-MAKING MECHANISM AGAINST B.
TERRORISM 
1. President’s Command Power 
Taiwan adopts a form of government called Semi-Presidentialism, which is 
similar to that of France. In terms of counterterrorism command, it is based on the 
amendment of the Constitution, Article 2, Paragraph 4: “The president may establish 
NSC and NSB in order to make decision related to major policies of national security.” 
Defense Act Article 9 regulates that: “The president should convene the NSC in order to 
make decision relating to the defense of national security plans, or in response to major 
defense emergency situations.” Further, the Organic Act of National Security Council 
Article 2 says that “NSC serves as the main advisory institute for the President when it 
comes to National Security.” Article 4 says that NSC is chaired by the President; 
according to the Draft Anti-Terrorist Action Law Article 3, Paragraph 3, the national 
security policy is dominated by the President. And the President of the Executive Yuan 
and the NSC are appointed by the President, with the presidential decision to execute 
policies.136 The President can obtain information on national security issues from the 
NSC in peacetime and when in a major crisis, officials can convene a meeting to develop 
or carry out crisis management. The Secretary of National Security Council, Director-
General of the National Security Bureau and consultant committee serve as the consulting 
and advisory members to the President for any presidential national security policy 
decisions. The convening of the NSC is required because it is not within the purview of  
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the Executive Yuan to perform in a crisis or when an emergency order issued. Therefore, 
it can petition the president to convene the meeting. The NSC has two functions: making 
“meeting decisions” and serving as an “advisory body.”137  
Although the President has the authority to decide major policies on national 
security defense, diplomacy, and cross-strait relations matters, the main authority for 
introducing a bill under normal conditions still resides with the Executive Yuan and 
lawmakers. In some cases, the Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan, and Control Yuan can 
also suggest some bills. The Constitution does not empower the president to propose bills. 
The Executive Yuan plays an important role in implementing the president’s political 
commitment and policy objectives; therefore, the bills that the president desires are 
proposed by the legislators from the same party or the Executive Yuan.138 However, the 
way that the President is empowered might have influence on decision making and the 
national security. Compared to the President of the United States, Taiwan’s President is 
granted less power by the Constitution. 139  Therefore, in national security decision-
making system, the NSC serves only as the presidential advisory entity and has no 
decision-making powers. The Executive Yuan is still the main actor and the role of the 
Executive Yuan has a significant impact on the President in issuing a decision. If the 
Premier and the President are in the same party, although a resolution from the NSC may 
be easy to pass, it may also sideline the Premier’s function or the function of the NSC, 
making their responsibilities more difficult.140  So while a bill is in the review process, it  
is subject to the interaction between the major political parties and legislators’ 
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administrative departments, political parties, and ideological factors, which are likely to 
be an important factor in a bill’s enactment.141 See Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. National Security Decision-Making Mechanisms.142 
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2. Status Quo of the Executive Yuan’s Counterterrorism 
Since the United States 9/11 incident, the Taiwan government is addressing the 
possible threat of international terrorism and activities. At all levels of the administrative 
system they are evaluating national conditions and formulating a comprehensive and 
holistic anti-terror mechanism, reviewing structure and contingency planning, 
coordinating and integrating the central government ministries. In addition, they are 
coordinating between the executive power and local government resources to jointly 
promote counterterrorism preparedness. 143  The Guidelines of Executive Yuan 
Counterterrorism Operation Team that were released on January 6, 2003, required a 
counterterrorism action policy, training and response mechanism, and other related 
matters. The team is formed by the president and the vice president of the Executive 
Yuan, members from the Ministries Council, and it totals 15 members. Every three 
months, the team members need to convene a meeting, or whenever necessary, and may 
invite experts and relevant agencies to send personnel to attend the meeting.144 
On November 16, 2004, the Executive Yuan Counterterrorism Operation Policy 
Meeting set up the Counterterrorism Framework and Organizations Operational 
Mechanism and passed it in August 2007. In addition, the Executive Yuan’s Office of 
Homeland Security was established and required as soon as possible completing the work 
on terrorism preparedness, strengthening counterterrorism drills that simulate the existing 
counterterrorism organization in Taiwan. The operation of the counterterrorism 
mechanism is to adopt the “dual-track” system, the national security system and 
administrative system. There are three phases, first is the “normal” phase, second is the 
“disaster” phase, and the third is the “recovery” phase. Between the first and second 
phase there is a “conversion mechanism” which is intended to assist a smooth transition 
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from the existing administrative structure to a function-oriented crisis response 
management organization.145 
At the “normal” phase, the Executive Yuan Homeland Security Policy Meeting, 
Executive Yuan Office of Homeland Security, Comprehensive Situation Analysis Team 
of NSC, NSB Situation Analysis Team, and Counterterrorism Intelligence Integration 
Center are responsible for instructing counterterrorism tasks (see Figure 10). The 
Executive Yuan Homeland Security Policy Meeting is responsible for counterterrorism 
policy making. In order to strengthen the function of the Executive Yuan 
Counterterrorism Policy Conference, the Executive Yuan Office of Homeland Security 
established a Counterterrorism Operations Control Office. The NSC convenes the NSB, 
the Executive Yuan system, intelligence agencies, and other personnel matters to 
establish a Comprehensive Situation Analysis Team of the NSC, in accordance with the 
future government tasks, to develop detection methods and conduct a preliminary 
prevention of terrorist attack. Furthermore, analyzing the situation, understanding the risk 
of terrorist attacks and terrorist attack types, and developing coping strategies according 
to intelligence, are also included activities. Finally, the Counterterrorism Intelligence 
Integration Center reports the analyzed results to the NSC.146 This system is based on the 
existing administrative structure to strengthen the communication mechanism between 
the Executive Yuan and national security system. It is intended to provide integrated 
intelligence for the president to make decisions about whether to start response 
mechanisms through a thorough communication and cooperation between the National 
Security System Office of Homeland Security and the Executive Yuan. 
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Figure 10. Central Government Counterterrorism Command System‒Normal Phase.147  
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In the “disaster” phase, the national security system is established by the NSC 
Counterterrorism Crisis Management Team. Depending on the types of terrorist attacks, 
the administrative system will build a counterterrorism organization. When more than 
two types of terrorist attacks occur, the Executive Yuan will initiate the First Class 
Operation Center. The Office of Homeland Security will report to the Executive Yuan 
Counterterrorism Policy Conference and suggest starting the Counterterrorism Response 
Center, according to the NSC Comprehensive Situation Analysis Team’s analyzed 
result.148 If a single terrorist attack occurs, the Executive Yuan will establish a Second 
Class Operation Center, chaired by the ministers and local governments. An Advance 
Command Post is established in the disaster area in accordance with the extent of damage. 
The heads of local governments are the commanders and regional military, police, 
firefighters, and civil defense units join to implement counterterrorism and relief missions 
(see Figure 11). Similarly, Taiwan is adopting this model to prevent and address natural 
disasters. In recent years, the damage caused by floods or typhoons has been effectively 
reduced. The central government and local governments can limit the losses and recover 
faster from disasters and also allocate resources within the region efficiently.  
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Figure 11. Central Government Counterterrorism Command System–Disaster Phase.149  
Currently, there are two problems for the government crisis response mechanism. 
First, the central authority to deal with disasters and crises is dependent on the types of 
disasters and crises. Although it can minimize the damage, the lack of prevention does 
not match the principle of crisis management. Because crisis management includes 
prevention, treatment, recovery and implementation, and its main purpose is to predict 
the potential occurrence of crisis and minimize the related damage.  
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Second, the high-speed rail bombing that occurred this year makes the 
government realize that the Executive Yuan Counterterrorism Operation Team did not 
convene the meeting on a regular basis. Even the Office of Homeland Security, which is 
responsible for the counterterrorism, has never had any meeting since it was established. 
However, on August 16, 2007, the Executive Yuan Homeland Security Three-in-One 
(Counterterrorism, Disaster prevention, All-out mobilization) Joint Policy Conference 
resolution said that the Executive Yuan Counterterrorism Office, in accordance with the 
Homeland Security Office, is to strengthen the function of the three systems and to 
coordinate with the Executive Yuan Homeland Security Three-in-One Joint Policy 
Conference. Take the United States and Japan as examples, after the 9/11 incident, the 
two countries adopted an All-hazards Common Response Mechanism for dealing with 
natural disasters and terrorists threats. 150  The U.S. established the Department of 
Homeland Security to ensure the nation’s security. It is not only limited to the purpose of 
combating terrorists but also for handling disaster management, border control, and 
transportation security. 151  Although the 2005 Katrina hurricane revealed the 
communication and integration problems between the federal, state, and local 
governments, it is not hard to see the determination of the U.S. government to strengthen 
its homeland security. Similarly, Japan passed the Terrorism Special Measures Act 
rapidly to support counterterrorism and create the Disaster Prevention Minister position 
under the Central Disasters Response Conference, which is responsible for disaster 
prevention and rescue operations. The purpose is to expand and strengthen disaster 
prevention and relief under the existing system. Both countries established interagency-
level components, while giving them greater powers to deal with disasters as well as 
more resources and flexibility in the implementation of substantially enhanced disaster 
prevention and crisis management capabilities..152 On the other hand, Taiwan’s current 
national counterterrorism response mechanisms, the Counterterrorism Operation and 
                                                 
150 Zhengfang Huang, “Building Homeland Security Five Response System and Homeland Security 
Net by All Hazards Approach,” 23‒25. 
151 Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security Office: Issues and Options, CRS Report 
RL31421 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, May 20, 2002). 
152 Chiunhsun Chen and Fangyo Huang, “Study on Taiwan’s Anti-Terrorism System after 9/11 Attack 
in USA,” New Technology (2008), 34‒35.  
 92
Policy Conference, the Central Disasters Response Conference, and National Defense 
Preparation Conference, all convene meetings in accordance with laws and regulations. 
However, the content of the meetings mostly overlap, although authorities, regulatory 
norms, and contingency mechanisms are not quite the same.153 As crises may occur in a 
split second or may also gradually evolve, they cannot be solved by a single agency. If a 
natural or man-made disaster occurs, addressing it involves vertical and horizontal 
linkage, coordination, and integration. Only if all the related units cooperate effectively 
will it bring out the true usage of all the resources when crisis happens. All kinds of 
simulation exercises, coordination, and allocation of resources or experience sharing will 
help all units to integrate well. 
3. National Security Council 
The function of the NSC is as an advisory body to the president on national 
security decision-making of major policies. The president, in peacetime, can get advice 
from the NSC on national security. In peacetime, the NSC also establishes a team for 
comprehensive judgments on a major crisis situation and convenes meetings immediately 
to solve crises.154 While the Constitution empowers the president to be responsible for 
foreign defense and cross-strait relations, the government ministries report mainly to the 
Executive Yuan; therefore, the NSC is important to the president in communicating and 
coordinating between different units. Compared to other advanced democratic countries, 
such as the U.S., Japan, France, and Britain, which hold regular NSC meetings, Taiwan 
has only convened non-regular NSC meetings so far. Although the Taiwan NSC’s 
purpose and function is similar to that of the NSC in other democratic countries, there are 
still substantial differences. The current national security mechanism regulates 
responsibilities for different units; the Department of Defense is responsible for national 
defense and military affairs; the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for major domestic 
disasters, and the Central Disasters Response Conference will integrate policies and 
allocate resources. In addition, the National Police Agency’s Central Disasters Response 
                                                 
153 Zhengfang Huang, “Building Homeland Security Five Response Systems and Homeland Security 
Net by All Hazards Approach,” 25.  
154 Jinqiang Su, “National Security and Crisis Management Mechanisms,” 15.  
 93
Center is responsible for the disaster relief mission, and the Atomic Energy Council is 
responsible for nuclear disasters. All these units are under the jurisdiction of the 
Executive Yuan, and the NSA is responsible for national security intelligence, which is 
under NSC jurisdiction. The two-track system of intelligence and administrative 
authorities is feasible currently, but the lack of one independent unit to integrate the 
various units will cause potential problems in coordination, command, and integration of 
resources when complex disasters occur.155 
According to the Executive Yuan’s counterterrorism operations structure, when 
the Comprehensive Situation Analysis Team of NSC determines an incident to be a 
terrorist attack, then the Counterterrorism Crisis Management Team will be responsible 
for managing the crisis. The NSC group, the Counterterrorism Department of the 
Homeland Office, and related staff are the main people who work for the 
counterterrorism response center. As mentioned earlier, the NSA and the administrative 
system should share intelligence, exchange information, and cooperate collectively; 
however, the different concepts of handling crises and the different structures of each unit 
might cause operation problems for the counterterrorism mechanism. 156 Although 
Taiwan’s NSC has a coordination mechanism between units, its function is similar to the 
Meeting of Deputy Directors of the U.S., which has a limited capability to deal with 
crisis.157 Furthermore, the scale of the NSC and its related units are smaller. In 2003, the 
Organic Act of the National Security Council amended the law to increase the number of 
staff from 9 to 11 people to 36 by 2008. It is still small compared with its U.S. 
counterpart which has 56 people.158 
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The NSC serves as the president’s advisory council, so it is as an extension of the 
presidential power, and the president’s power is highly related to the function of the NSC. 
The president’s political party affiliation also affects NSC’s policies, especially in terms 
of national identity, often resulting in partisanship, and indirectly affects the 
implementation of national security policy. If the national security system and 
administrative system do not interact and connect well with one another on a regular 
basis to maintain good connection, it will also cause a weak vertical linkage. But national 
security policy is highly related to national interests and the welfare of the people; hence, 
the president and the political parties should not be bound by their party politics and 
should let the NSC play an actual function.159  
  RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES C.
1. Status Quo 
The NSC is the main intelligence agency in Taiwan. The Organization Act of 
NSB was established in 1994 and ensures the NSC integrates intelligence and implements 
special tasks.160 The current law enforcement related to intelligence is based on the 
Organic Act of the National Security Council, the Organic Act of NSB, the Classified 
National Security Information Protection Act, and the Act of National Intelligence Work. 
Even though some units besides the NSC have the capability to collect intelligence, the 
NSC is still the lead of national security. In order to avoid intelligence agencies 
interference in politics, the Legislative Yuan passed the Act of National Intelligence 
Work on January 14, 2005, and finished amending it in 2011. The Act of National 
Intelligence Work regulates that the intelligence agencies should be neutral politically 
and cannot involve themselves in political activities. In addition, Article 2 of the newly 
amended Organization Act of NSB regulates that the NSB belongs to the NSC and 
integrates national security intelligence and implements special tasks. 161 The NSC 
                                                 
159 Hong, “The Study of the Relationship between Intelligence and National Security under 
Globalization,” 176‒177.  
160 “Organization Act of National Security Bureau,” Rootlaw. 
http://www.rootlaw.com.tw/LawArticle.aspx?LawID=A030010000001800-1001231.  
161 Ibid.  
 95
Counterterrorism Intelligence Integration Center manages all the intelligence agencies 
and convenes the General Coordination Meeting of National Intelligence on a regular 
basis. Furthermore, the general coordination meeting of National Intelligence 
Implementing Regulations convenes the sub-meetings on international intelligence, 
intelligence about the Chinese mainland area, security intelligence of the Taiwan area, 
science-technology intelligence, and communications security separately to ensure the 
function of the whole intelligence system can be carried out completely (see Figure 
12). 162  The NSB now has six intelligence-related divisions which are International 
Intelligence, Intelligence within the Area of People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, 
Analysis of the Nation’s Strategic Intelligence and Telecommunications Security and 
Control and Development of Secret Codes and Development of Secret Codes and 
Facilities. Each agency is still responsible for its own area of intelligence. However, 
national security is always beyond one level and no one single unit can provide a 
complete analysis of intelligence. If there were an office to integrate all the intelligence, 
record suspicious terrorist information, and establish a complete database, then the 
Taiwan can grasp terrorist intelligence more effectively.163  
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Figure 12. National Intelligence Operation System.164 
2. Revolution and Integration of Intelligence Sources 
Due to the variety of intelligence agencies, there are conflicts or overlaps between 
them. Duplicity of work not only wastes time and money, it also leads to inefficiency 
when it comes to responding to natural disasters or combating terrorists. It reveals the 
importance of integration and coordination between agencies. Take the United States as 
an example; there was a major reform of intelligence agencies after the 9/11 incident. The 
reform effort was intended to coordinate intelligence work between the Department of 
National Defense, NSC, and CIA. However, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, 
the United States’ “Intelligence Community lacks cooperation among the different 
components and [does not place] the emphasis on information sharing and collaboration 
[called for] in the 2004 law.”165 In the U.S., intelligence gathering units belong to various 
agencies, among which the Department of Defense has the most advanced high-tech 
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equipment. The Department of Defense also does not get along well with the CIA.166 The 
parochialism has existed for a long time, making these agencies unable to integrate 
existing information systems. The nature of intelligence cannot be enhanced when 
various intelligence agencies lack cooperation, adequate training and education, as well 
as support for the intelligence units from other leaders. All of which are deeply affected 
by the intelligence reform efforts after 9/11. In order to improve this phenomenon in the 
U.S., besides actively maintaining the balance between democracy and intelligence, the 
use of satellite technology, the legislative, budgetary, and oversight powers, intelligence 
personnel training, etc., are all expected to enhance intelligence capabilities and 
integration. 167  Another problem is that these agencies are involved in intelligence 
gathering which might violate citizens’ civil rights and cause controversy. So while 
intelligence units, under the principle of safeguarding national security, have much 
authority to engage in communications and network monitoring, it still requires the 
government’s effort to improve these problems.  
As for Japan, after the 9/11 incident, in order to increase intelligence gathering 
capability, the government also reformed the structure of intelligence agencies by giving 
them more power, more flexibility in gathering intelligence, and authorizing more 
resources. Japan greatly enhanced its ability to handle and prevent a crisis. On the 
intelligence units’ horizontal and vertical contacts, the contract intelligence meeting, the 
Cabinet Intelligence Conference convene intelligence unit meet periodically to solve the 
problems of intelligence sharing. In the aspect of improving intelligence gathering 
capacity, the intelligence-gathering satellite program began in 1998, and in 2003 began to 
launch spy satellites, which take a picture every day, so to improve emergency response 
capabilities.168 In addition, extensive use of private intelligence agencies to assist in 
intelligence gathering was causing problems, such as hard-to-discipline employees and  
 
                                                 
166 Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National Security 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 43‒44. 
167 Ibid., 17‒19.  
168 Jianzhong Lan, “A Secret: Japanese Launched an Information Gathering Satellite Radar-4,” People, 
January 30, 2013. http://scitech.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2013/0130/c1007-20370332.html. 
 98
standards that were difficult to maintain. The pros and cons related to U.S. and Japanese 
counterterrorism intelligence mechanisms can be an important reference for Taiwan’s 
intelligence system. 
As for Taiwan’s intelligence sharing mechanism, the current Draft of the Anti-
Terrorist Action Law, the Legislative Yuan Revised Version, and the Act of National 
Intelligence Work require all the government agencies to share intelligence related to 
national security. Besides the intelligence collecting done by the NSB, the five Yuans and 
related agencies have to provide intelligence to the NSB. The NSB will integrate and 
analyze all the intelligence and then send the results to the NSC Comprehensive Situation 
Analysis Team. The Comprehensive Situation Analysis Team will then distribute the 
results to different agencies for reference. Meanwhile, all the agencies can request 
intelligence information they need for the purpose of national security. However, there 
are no detailed rules regarding the request process and this might cause some confusion. 
Furthermore, even though the NSB is responsible for integrating, coordinating, and 
supporting all the intelligence agencies, there are some difficulties in reality because 
different agencies belong to different units. The NSB has no power over other 
intelligence agencies’ employees and budget review.169 There are some other problems; 
for example, the NSB’s central command structure of counterterrorism is the same level 
as that of the other agencies, and therefore it has no power to control others. Unlike the 
U.S. Department of the Homeland Security which has a complete intelligence 
management system, Taiwan also lacks experience in counterterrorism, and there is less 
horizontal integration between agencies. Even if there were an inter-agency 
counterterrorism unit, it would require a breakthrough innovation in the effective 
integration and use of the intelligence so that it is could effectively control any possible 
counterterrorism intelligence. 
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 CHAPTER CONCLUSION D.
In order to diversify the intelligence source and to avoid the monopoly of one 
intelligence agency, countries establish all kinds of intelligence agencies as needed. This 
diverse approach prevents the excessive concentration of power in intelligence agencies. 
Therefore, the overlap of responsibilities but no subordinate relationship between 
agencies is necessary. In sum, establishing an intelligence coordination mechanism is 
necessary. 170  Learning from the U.S. and Japan’s experience of establishing 
counterterrorism mechanisms, it is not difficult to see that integrating different 
intelligence agencies is helpful for Taiwan to deal with complex disasters. And 
integrating agencies needs a complete law as a support. Taiwan is currently adopting a 
two-track national security and administrative system. In terms of the administrative 
system, although the government passed the Executive Yuan Homeland Security Three-
in-One Joint Policy Conference in 2007 and worked with the Executive Yuan 
Counterterrorism Office to establish the Office of Homeland Security, the office is 
responsible for commanding and integrating complex disasters, which is beyond its 
capability. In terms of the national security system, NSC receives intelligence from the 
NSB and analyzes it. Then the NSC provides the president suggestions related to national 
security. However, the scale of the NSC is too small, its responsibility is too vague, and it 
places too much emphasis on secrecy, so it is hard for the NSC to deal with complex 
national security issues.171 At the same time, the NSB needs to analyze and integrate all 
the intelligence from all the agencies, and whether or not the current system can 
implement that is also debatable. Therefore, the policy makers and the executors need to 
put aside disputes of party preference and political interests and face current problems. 
The high-speed rail bombing in April 2003 reveals that the government over-emphasized 
dealing with disasters when they happen, but neglected the importance of prevention. 
Although there are some current related regulations, the related units cannot implement 
thoroughly. Some loopholes in government agencies also make people doubt whether the 
                                                 
170 Zhiping Zhou, “The Introduction and Analysis of the Act of National Intelligence Work” (PhD 
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171 Wenzheng Chen, “The Coordination and Integration Functions of National Security Council: The 
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intelligence units are well trained and professional enough to deal with certain situations, 
and whether they are politically neutral. It is a good opportunity for the Executive Yuan, 




VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Currently, anti-terrorism has become one of the world’s major tasks for national 
security. Although Taiwan is not the main target of international terrorist organizations, it 
still cannot be ruled out as a potential terrorist hiding place or criminal activity “relay 
station.” As for Taiwan, in order to strengthen its homeland security, some missions still 
need completion, such as supporting and participating in anti-terrorism, enhancing its 
counterterrorism capability, seeking integration with the international community against 
terrorism, developing bilateral and multilateral relations of cooperation, expanding 
international activities, and making efforts in international security and for its own 
interests. 172  Since the 9/11 terrorist attack, Taiwan has made many efforts on anti-
terrorism. Some of these efforts include executing the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1373-related matters, supporting international anti-terrorism actions, 
establishing the relevant anti-terrorism response unit, developing anti-terrorism laws and 
regulations, and providing the international community with humanitarian relief. 
Moreover, Taiwan has strengthened domestic ministries related to specific emergency 
response types and has actively promoted the signing of mutual legal assistance 
agreements or memoranda, and controlling the Foreign Ministry and border units’ visa 
issuance, strengthening of international intelligence cooperation, grasping important 
members of  terrorist organizations, integrating anti-terrorist intelligence information by 
the National Security Bureau, and creating a database of international terrorism and other 
anti-terrorism acts. All these measures are for the purpose of ensuring homeland security. 
Taiwan’s unique geographic environment that has contributed to it enduring natural 
disasters make it necessary and urgent for Taiwan to integrate the existing Homeland 
Security Response System. 
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Our counterterrorism response mechanism is based on the Disaster Prevention and 
Response Act and is combined with National Defense Mobilization System, which refer 
to the U.S. Patriot Act and Japan’s Terrorist Countermeasures Support Act to develop a 
draft of the Counterterrorism Law. After analyzing and comparing the two countries’ 
current practices, and then viewing the mechanism in Taiwan, the findings and 
recommendations are summarized as below: 
 ESTABLISH COMPLETE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE A.
COUNTRY 
Taiwan’s government system is similar to France’s Semi-Presidential system. 
After the 1997 constitutional amendment, Taiwan adopted the vote of no confidence and 
dissolution of the parliamentary mechanism; on the other hand, Taiwan also gives the 
president the power to appoint the head of Executive Yuan and the president of National 
Security Council without consent of the Legislative Yuan. Furthermore, Taiwan has 
adopted the two-track system, national security and administrative system, to combat 
terrorism. However, there is no consensus on how to identify the system of government. 
Due to the different political parties in power, the president belongs to the ruling party. 
When it is opposite to the majority party this leads to conflict among the government, 
Legislative Yuan, and opposition party. Therefore, whether or not the Legislative Yuan 
supports the president is directly related to the disaster response mechanism that was 
promoted by the Executive Yuan and NSA. After comparing the U.S. and Japanese 
command systems, we can tell that both the Cabinet system and the presidential system 
give great power to the commander-in-chief, and if necessary, the commander can skip 
the current mechanism and give orders directly. In the aspect of the administrative system, 
the president has the power to influence national security decision-making. In the 
exercise of executive power, the Executive Yuan is the highest administrative ministry. 
But the President has the power to depose the head of Executive Yuan, so the president is 
still influential under the semi-presidential system and Executive Yuan. As for the 
national security system, the National Security Council, in accordance with the Organic 
Law of the National Security Council, can provide a reference for the president to make 
major decisions for national security. However, the Constitution did not give too much 
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power to the president. Coupled with the low profile of the political culture, when dealing 
with national security and responding to counterterrorism, it is difficult to integrate 
among ministries.173 But if the president emphasizes national security affairs more, then 
there will be a conflict when exercising the executive power. These issues are affecting 
the two-track system of the administrative and national security mechanism. In view of 
this, at all levels of government involved in the national security command mechanism, 
the role of the National Security implementation units and advisory units should be clear. 
Furthermore, a complete law should be established to improve the legal authority and to 
enhance integration, coordination, and operational functions, and to jointly promote the 
state’s disaster response mechanism. 
 IMPROVE THE LEGAL FORMULATION AND REVISION B.
Terrorism has a significant impact on international security, and anti-terrorist 
efforts will be a long-term government activity. After 9/11, the United States developed a 
so-called Patriot Act, Japan also passed an Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law to 
strengthen the fight against terrorism. Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice has currently drafted 
The Anti-Terrorism Act and the content is more focused on crisis management and 
recovery. But it is still inadequate for preventing crisis. A regulated law is the base of 
enforcement, which is an important part of a democratic country. Although Taiwan’s 
administration and the national security system are in accordance with the draft anti-
terrorism law to complete the current response mechanism, the draft, after all, has not 
been passed formally by the legislative authorities, and the legal system is still flawed. 
Compared to the Western democracies, because of the diversity of terrorists, the U.S., 
Japan, and Canada all passed anti-terrorism laws in order to effectively control terrorism. 
As for Taiwan, where terrorism has not yet been defined as a major threat to the country, 
it does not mean that a terrorist attack will not happen. So far, the draft anti-terrorism law 
between the government and the Legislative Yuan has not yet reached a consensus. After 
analyzing the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan’s version of the draft anti-
terrorism law, we can tell that most of the existing legal norms in Taiwan’s domestic law 
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have been given. If Taiwan strengthens law enforcement just to reflect the widespread 
international action against terrorism, it may not match the real needs of the country, and 
will raise the human rights issue. Therefore, Taiwan should refer to the legal norms of the 
United States, Japan, and other advanced countries and view Taiwan’s current regulations 
from the angle of “complex disasters.” Taiwan should emphasize the command system’s 
coordination, connection, and resource-sharing at all levels of the organization and 
consider whether it is necessary to set up a specific law in response to anti-terrorism. It is 
also important to consider the balance between national security and civil rights. 
In terms of the National Security Act, the Executive Yuan has completed an 
amendment to the National Security Act in 2013, with a total of ten Articles, but the 
content is still partial to defense and military security.174 Currently, all countries are 
facing not only the traditional security threat (defense, military, diplomacy), but also the 
non-traditional threat (terrorist attack, natural disasters, or complex disasters). America’s 
Hurricane Katrina and the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, reveal that the damage to 
national security, people’s property, and lives due to climate change is far more 
catastrophic than terrorist attacks. Therefore, the definition of national security should be 
adjusted to address an “all disaster response” as the basis of national security policy 
planning, which is preparing Taiwan to have a comprehensive protection concept. 
Therefore, I recommend that the existing National Security Law should be re-examined. 
Moreover, Taiwan should use the angle of complex disaster to reset laws in order to 
improve the national security system.  
 INTEGRATE AND STRENGTHEN THE THREE-LEVEL C.
GOVERNMENT CRISIS MANAGEMENT MECHANISM 
After 9/11, the purpose of establishing the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
was not only as a response to terrorism, but also as a way to integrate disaster 
management, border control, and transportation safety, etc. 175  The Department of 
Homeland Security emphasizes the integration of combating terrorism, enhancing the 
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efficiency of organizations, and sharing resources. Japan also uses disaster prevention as 
the umbrella under which the mechanism for responding to all disasters, including natural 
disasters, resides. And the whole system is dominated by the Cabinet. From the 
experience of these two countries, we can see that future disasters are likely to be 
complex. When a disaster happens, it will inevitably involve a number of units; hence, 
the unit established only for the purpose of counterterrorism is not enough. Currently, 
Taiwan has established emergency mechanisms for different central government 
ministries. And the local governments also have mechanisms based on the Disaster 
Prevention and Protection Act, which combines civil defense, police, army, and civil 
society organizations to create a complete disaster response system. However, such a 
system was established only after a disaster, which reflects a lack of advance prevention 
and a lack of coordination and contacts on the part of central ministries and local 
guidance.  
Taiwan’s government changed the Executive Yuan’s anti-terrorism office to the 
Office of Homeland Security on August 16, 2007, to strengthen the role of coordinating 
disaster, disaster prevention, and response functions, as well as the national mobilization 
and counterterrorism response mechanism. It also served as the Executive Yuan’s three-
in-one joint policy consolidation office. However, after the 2013 high-speed railway 
bombing, Taiwan realized that its Office of Homeland Security’s function has not been 
carried out. There are only 11 staff members and they are not permanent dedicated 
personnel for the Office of Homeland Security. Moreover, the budget has decreased 
gradually. The office also lacks coordination and there is no advanced planning for 
communication. In addition to these logistical and operational challenges, the definition 
of terrorism varies from central government to local government; therefore, there is no 
detailed planning between units and no one specific unit to deal with terrorist attacks. 
These problems still need to be solved by government agencies and national security-
related units. Meanwhile, the government must address public opinion and perceptions. 
People doubt that Taiwan can handle complex disasters under the current response 
mechanism. Therefore, I would suggest that the Office of Homeland Security be the core 
to plan, integrate, control, and manage natural disasters, and complex disasters. 
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Furthermore, the Executive Yuan should coordinate the Counterterrorism Operation and 
Policy Conference, the Central Disasters Response Conference, and other types of 
national security conferences in order to increase the connection and information sharing 
between agencies. On the other hand, if the Office of Homeland Security can remain 
neutral in the face of party politics, it will become a complete crisis response mechanism. 
It will also make the response mechanism become a proactive and preventive mechanism 
rather than a reactive mechanism that only springs to action when a disaster occurs. 
 ENHANCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND EARLY WARNING D.
MECHANISM  
Currently, Taiwan’s counterterrorism intelligence gathering is the responsibility 
of the National Security Bureau. All the other intelligence units collect terrorist-related 
intelligence and send this information to the NSB, which distributes it to the Intelligence 
Operation Divisions for further analysis. The analysis results will be provided to the NSC 
for reference in policy making. The NSC is responsible for integrating and analyzing the 
intelligence collected by different units. The intelligence has generally been more about 
national defense and military issues. But in recent years, in order to deal with Taiwan’s 
severe weather and the possible threat of international terrorists, Taiwan has adopted the 
U.S. model to expand the NSC structure, and to strengthen its intelligence analysis and 
research capability. As for the NSB, it is responsible for integrating intelligence from all 
units and intelligence related to national security. Although there are six departments 
responsible for intelligence analysis, there is no one specific unit for analyzing 
intelligence. If Taiwan can establish one unit for integration, responsible for analyzing 
intelligence and providing it to NSC for reference, then it will be more efficient and 
functional.  
In addition, through the current Counterterrorism Framework and Organizations 
Operational Mechanisms, the NSB can gain intelligence through cooperating with the 
international community. The Office of Homeland Security can gather information about 
natural disasters and major infrastructure through nine response teams of the Executive 
Yuan. Although each unit of the Office of Homeland Security is equipped with its own 
personnel, they are too few and not permanent, which causes people to doubt that office’s 
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professional capability and function. Also, in recent years, the major disasters Taiwan has 
endured have been both man-made and natural, and the disasters involved different units. 
The impacts of the natural disasters have been more severe than those of a terrorist attack. 
The Counterterrorism Framework and Organizations Operational Mechanisms are only 
related to NSC’s intelligence sharing and analysis, but have nothing to do with NSB. This 
mechanism is not helpful for Taiwan in dealing with future complex disasters.  
In order to improve this situation, I suggest the following methods: first, enhance 
the coordination and contact mechanism between the NSB and the nine response centers 
to establish a platform for intelligence sharing. Use the Central Disasters Response 
Conference as the main body and combine the Counterterrorism Information and Policy 
Conference and National Mobilization Conference to enhance the efficiency of 
emergency response. Second, change the Executive Yuan Department of Homeland 
Security to a full-time group and group it in accordance to the types of the nine response 
centers in order to facilitate effective information for reference use by the NSC. Third, 
the National Security Council on the counterterrorism response mechanism is a national 
security policy advisory body for the president. After obtaining intelligence related to the 
national security, besides notifying the related administrative units, the NSC also needs to 
maintain contact with the Office of Homeland Security and then research and analyze the 
intelligence before reporting it to the president as reference for decision making. For this 
reason, the current NSC grouping makes it difficult to analyze the information provided 
by the NSA and the Office of Homeland Security, Executive Yuan. I recommend 
expanding NSC’s professional advisers, many of whom have the capability to judge and 
analyze intelligence. In addition to the two-track system of administration and national 
security, a clear definition of endangering national security is needed. If the 
aforementioned problems can be improved, the crisis management mechanism will be 
improved. When an emergency occurs, accurate information can be provided efficiently 
to the president for reference.176   
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